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Abstract 
State governments have taken the lead on U.S. energy and climate policy. It is not yet 
clear, however, whether state energy policy portfolios can generate results in a similar 
magnitude or manner to their presumed carbon mitigation potential. This article seeks to 
address this lack of policy evidence and contribute empirical insights on the carbon 
mitigation effects of state energy portfolios within the U.S. electricity sector. Using a 
dynamic, long-term electricity dispatch model with U.S. power plant, utility, and 
transmission and distribution data between 2010 and 2030, this analysis builds a series of 
state-level policy portfolio scenarios and performs a comparative scenario analysis. 
Results reveal that state policy portfolios have modest to minimal carbon mitigation 
effects in the long run if surrounding states do not adopt similar portfolios as well. The 
difference in decarbonization potential between isolated state policies and larger, more 
coordinated policy efforts is due in large part to carbon leakage, which is the export of 
carbon intensive fossil fuel-based electricity across state lines. Results also confirm that a 
carbon price of $50/metric ton CO2e can generate substantial carbon savings. Although 
both policy options—an energy policy portfolio or a carbon price—are effective at 
reducing carbon emissions in the present analysis, neither is as effective alone as when 
the two strategies are combined. 
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1. Introduction 
Motivated by Pacala and Socolow’s ―stabilization wedge‖ concept (2004), as well 
as similar ideas presented by the Electric Power Research Institute—the ―prism‖ 
(2007)—and others, an increasing number of states have adopted energy policy portfolios 
(or packages) since the early 2000s in effort to reduce carbon emissions. The rationale for 
portfolios, as opposed to single policies, is appropriately captured in a common energy 
policy saying: ―there is no silver bullet.‖ Indeed, by the very nature of their construction, 
portfolio strategies allow states to assemble clusters of instruments, which may not 
produce significant effects individually but, when combined, have the potential to 
provide compounding carbon mitigation effects (Gunningham and Gabrosky, 1998). 
Furthermore, state portfolios tend to include a combination of policies from a variety of 
sectors, including electricity supply, transportation, agriculture, forestry, land-use, and 
residential, commercial, and industrial. A multi-sector strategy allows states to spread the 
costs and responsibility of carbon mitigation among various industries. Portfolio 
strategies can also be more effective than single instruments because they have the 
potential to target multiple externalities at once and achieve carbon reductions at a lower 
overall cost than a single policy (Fisher and Newell, 2008). 
There is a great need—in both the policy realm and the energy literature—for 
information on how well state policy portfolios perform in the electricity sector. Most 
immediately, empirical evidence on the carbon mitigation, or ―decarbonization,‖ effects 
of state level energy policy portfolios could help states draft future legislation, reevaluate 
and amend past legislation when appropriate, and form more complete perceptions about 
the actual effects of these policies on carbon mitigation and other energy sector trends. 
Empirical evidence could also lend insights into questions about the effects of 
―progressive federalism‖ or ―collaborative federalism‖ (Rabe, 2008) on energy and the 
environment. For instance, is it effective for states to implement climate action plans on a 
state-by-state basis rather then pursue a regional or national level effort? Or, alternatively 
conceptualized, is there value in tailoring specific portfolios to specific states or would 
regional or national standards ultimately be more effective? Should states continue to 
implement energy policy portfolios even if a national level carbon tax or permit 
legislation is passed? This type of analysis could provide broader conclusions about the 
overlap between energy policy and climate policy, and suggest ways in which these two 
policy foci can merge in future state or national legislation. 
The present analysis seeks to address this need in the policy realm and contribute 
further empirical insights into the energy policy literature. The guiding research question 
is as follows: is a state energy policy portfolio an effective decarbonization strategy? This 
analysis is an exercise of explanation and prediction based on scenario-based electricity 
sector modeling. An energy modeling exercise allows one to track multiple, current 
trends within the electricity sector as a result of various policy scenarios, and also 
consider firm decision-making procedures as a result of these same scenarios. The intent 
of the present analysis is to compare potential policy effects in the electricity sector, 
primarily on carbon emissions, and secondarily on electricity price and electric 
generation portfolios, and to draw inferences regarding the overall decarbonization 
effectiveness of state-level policy portfolios. In this vein of inquiry, I build a series of 
policy portfolio scenarios, and apply them at first to the state level and second to the 
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regional level. Next, I run the same scenarios with the inclusion of a carbon tax, and 
compare results. 
 
2. Background 
Although the approach varies a bit from state to state, states generally assemble 
and prioritize different combinations of energy policies via an interactive planning 
process. This process is typically guided by a policymaker-appointed working group of 
stakeholders and members with state-specific technical knowledge (Center for Climate 
Strategies, 2008). Outside consultants may provide technical and analytic assistance to 
the working group. The working group and consultants collectively generate a climate 
action plan, or climate change mitigation plan, which outlines all possible multi-sector 
policy options, the carbon mitigation potential of each, and the cost per ton of avoided 
carbon. Some plans also provide suggestions for policymakers on which policies most 
effectively reduce the state’s greenhouse gas emissions below a certain threshold. To 
date, twenty states have undergone this type of process, several more are currently in the 
middle of similar processes, and roughly ten states have established policy portfolios 
through different means (Center for Climate Strategies, 2008; see the Center for Climate 
Strategy’s website for an interactive map of different state actions). In total, 37 states 
have drafted some version of a climate action plan (Energy Information Administration, 
2009). Often as a result of this type of taskforce, specific policies are identified as the 
most promising options, and further analyses are performed on the cost-effectiveness or 
overall costs of these policies.  
The majority of climate action plans, state level carbon inventories, and specific-
policy cost estimates are performed using complex spreadsheet analyses (see, for 
instance, New Mexico Climate Change Advisory Group, 2006; North Carolina Climate 
Action Plan Advisory Group, 2008; Montana Climate Change Advisory Committee, 
2007). These analyses include information on historic energy data and Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) projected growth rates. In a review of all state-level 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) cost analyses performed before March 2007, Chen 
and his colleagues found that 16 out of 26 studies used spreadsheet analyses (Chen et al., 
2007). Spreadsheet analyses may be appropriate for policy scenarios in which projections 
of policy effects may be fairly straightforward. It is immensely difficult, however, to 
capture the dynamics of an electricity sector in a linear spreadsheet projection. 
Spreadsheets cannot capture fluctuations in state exports and imports as a result of a new 
policy, transmission constraints, electricity system operating characteristics, wholesale 
power prices, or utility-level decisions that are made about which resources to develop 
and deploy in response to new regulatory circumstances. 
The supporting peer-reviewed energy policy literature contains a number of 
analyses that employ dynamic models to estimate potential national electricity policy 
effects on carbon emissions. Kydes (2007) and Palmer and Burtraw (2005) recently 
modeled RPS policies using bottom-up energy models. Kydes analyzed the potential 
effect of a 20 percent federal non-hydro based RPS on energy markets in the U.S. using 
the EIA’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). He concluded that RPS policies 
effectively increase renewable energy adoption, reduce emissions, and increase the cost 
of electricity by three percent. Palmer and Burtraw modeled variations of federal RPS 
policies and tracked policy effects on electricity prices, utility investment levels, resource 
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deployment portfolios, and carbon emissions. They used Resources for the Future’s 
Haiku model and the EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2003 data to model the RPS policies. 
They concluded that RPS costs are low for goals of 15 percent or less but rise 
significantly with goals of 20 percent or higher. Palmer and Burtraw also compared the 
effects of an RPS policy with those resulting from an expanded renewable energy 
production tax credit. They concluded that RPS policies are more cost-effective than a tax 
credit at decreasing total carbon emissions and increasing renewable energy deployment. 
They found that a cap-and-trade system, however, is more cost-effective than either an 
RPS or a renewable energy production tax credit.  
A number of analysts modeled the clean energy technology policies (Brown et al, 
2001, Gumerman et al., 2001; Hadley and Short, 2001) proposed in Scenarios for a Clean 
Energy Future (Interlaboratory Working Group, 2001), a Department of Energy 
document that lists and discusses the highest priority energy technologies. These analyses 
clustered policy instruments into a moderate policy scenario and an advanced policy 
scenario, respectively, and then sought to measure the economic and environmental 
effects of these scenarios using NEMS software. Results from these analyses indicate that 
national-level energy policy portfolios have the potential to significantly reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions by 2020. 
In a recent study, Fisher and Newell (2008) built a simplified two-period 
electricity model, which they used to estimate the effects of various energy and climate 
policies on carbon mitigation and renewable energy development and deployment. Fisher 
and Newell’s analysis has three defining characteristics that set it apart from previous 
studies. First, their two-period model allows for the endogeneity of technological 
innovation. Second, their analysis includes both energy and climate policies. They test 
the effects of these policies on energy and climate outcomes, i.e. renewable energy 
development and carbon reduction, respectively. As a result, the authors are able to draw 
conclusions about the relative effectiveness of energy policies for climate policy 
objectives and of climate policies for energy policy objectives. Third, Fisher and Newell 
compare the relative effectiveness of policy portfolios to single policy outcomes. They 
find that an emissions price is the least costly option for emissions reductions, followed 
by an emissions performance standard, a fossil fuel power tax, a renewable share 
requirement, a renewable power subsidy, and a research and development subsidy, 
respectively. The authors also find that an optimal policy portfolio is associated with a 
significantly lower cost of emissions reduction than any single policy option.  
Despite the insightful contributions that these analyses provide to the literature, no 
studies have modeled energy policy instruments or portfolios at the state level and 
tracked the dynamics among and between states. Yet, to date, the majority of U.S. 
decarbonization efforts are concentrated in the states. National policy modeling, as is the 
norm in the literature, allows for a general comparison of policy effects or costs, but one 
cannot be sure that these results translate into state-relevant lessons. National level 
models do not capture the interaction between neighboring states, for instance, when one 
state has a policy and a second state does not. National modeling exercises also do not 
contribute insights on energy federalism, such as the relative effects of state versus 
regional or national level policy efforts. Given the current trends of state level leadership 
in the energy-climate policy realm, and the possibility of national legislation that may 
alter these trends in still unforeseen ways, the need for state-specific analyses is great. 
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3. Modeling framework 
Following the precedent set by these national-level energy modeling analyses, the 
present study tests various energy portfolio scenarios in a dynamic modeling 
environment. This exercise has three characteristics that distinguish it from the literature. 
First, this modeling analysis specifically focuses on state level portfolios, which are, as 
just described, largely overlooked in the energy modeling literature. Second, building on 
the efforts of Fisher and Newell (2008) and others, this analysis focuses on policy 
portfolios, not just single policies in isolation. Finally, the present analysis models policy 
portfolio effects that are specific to the electricity sector.  
This analysis employs an electricity dispatch optimization model, AURORAxmp, 
to test various policy scenarios. AURORAxmp is used, as opposed to an integrated 
energy model such as NEMS, because it is exceedingly difficult to isolate states, the 
focus of this analysis, in an integrated national energy sector model (Chen et al., 2007). 
AURORAxmp is frequently used by state utility commissions and electric utilities in both 
regulated and non-regulated states to simulate short-term resource dispatch based on 
competitive wholesale electricity market prices.
 1
 AURORAxmp also has the capability 
to perform long-term capacity expansion modeling, which is used for the purposes of this 
analysis, based on hourly forecasts of fuel prices and electricity demand. 
AURORAxmp’s optimization logic maximizes the real levelized net present value 
(in $/MW) of all available resources with realistic transmission capacity constraints in 
order to meet instantaneous electricity demand. This calculation is performed using a 
chronological dispatch algorithm. Resources with optimum net benefits—on a pure 
benefit minus cost basis—are selected for deployment in a given zone in a given hour.2 
Resources that are not cost-competitive are retired. The resulting balance of resources 
determines the market-clearing price for each zone in each hour. These hourly dispatch 
decisions—which are collected every fourth hour, four days a week on alternating 
weeks—are combined in an iterative process until the model is able to extract the 
resource mix that is most economically efficient over the life of the analysis. As part of 
the resource optimization logic, AURORAxmp tracks capacity expansion and facility 
retirements, performs lifecycle analyses, considers a range of new supply resources, 
                                                          
1
 Many NERC regions, such as the Western Electric Coordinating Council, the unit of analysis in the 
present study, have service territories that are regulated primarily at the retail level; however, utilities and 
utility commissions within these regions often rely on competitive wholesale power markets to inform rate 
cases, create integrated resource plans, or inform dispatch and operations that account for opportunities 
from the wholesale power market. Additionally, despite not having a central clearing market and region-
wide independent system operator, as is common in the Northeast and Texas, many regions with regulated 
retail sales still have several market hubs that are fairly liquid in their wholesale power trades. Utilties and 
planning commissions within these regions, therefore, still use models such as AURORAxmp for both 
short-term and long-term energy planning. 
2
 A resource’s capability is determined in the following process: the model reads the system capacity, and 
then reduces it by forced outage assumptions, maintenance outage assumptions, reserve withholdings, and 
commitment assumptions (i.e., fulfilling a minimum up or down time). One could further restrict the 
capability of various resources—wind energy, for instance—by assuming hourly or monthly shaping 
factors; however, given the sampling methodology of the present analysis, in which dispatch decisions over 
the long-term are made during a selected sample of dispatch hours, dispatch decisions will be more 
accurate if the shaping factor is set to zero but the capability is still refined according to the process 
described above.  
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selects resources for deployment based on hourly market values and reserve margin 
requirements, and tracks transmission exchanges between states and regions.  
Electricity trading is determined in the following manner. Locations are divided 
into zones that resemble individual or clusters of traditional service territories; these 
zones are not necessarily delineated according to state lines. As part of the dispatch logic, 
the model identifies trading opportunities on an hourly basis between zones based on 
differences in the marginal cost of energy to meet demand in each zone. For instance, if 
one zone has a marginal cost of electricity of $40/MWh and additional resource capacity 
at $45/MWh, and a neighboring zone has a marginal cost of electricity of $50/MWh, the 
neighboring zone will be more likely to import the less expensive $45/MWh generation 
from the first zone than dispatch its own local resource stack. Incremental amounts of 
electricity are imported and exported from zone to zone in an iterative process until the 
model eventually settles on the export-import amounts that leave no further opportunity 
for trade, which is generally the case when the difference in zonal marginal prices is at its 
minimum. 
AURORAxmp allows one to set reserve margins at both the zonal and pool level. 
We assume no restrictions at the zonal level but a 12 percent reserve margin at the pool 
level for all WECC pools. 
AURORAxmp’s long-term optimization model requires the following inputs: 
electricity demand growth rates; annual load growth; generation capacity characteristics, 
such as fixed and variable costs, capacity size, start-up times, heat rates, minimum up- 
and down-times, forced outage requirements, and peak load multipliers; a list of existing 
resources or forced builds; planning reserve requirements; emissions prices and emissions 
rates for each fuel type; transmission links between zones and regions; and new resource 
options. 
Aurora generates outputs on an hourly, daily, monthly, and annual basis. For a 
long-term study, I am interested in the annual estimates. Standard annual outputs include 
total generation by fuel type, electricity price by area, inter-area and inter-regional 
transactions, emissions estimates, and imports and exports figures. The model provides 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but does not break them down by type of greenhouse 
gas. Therefore, it is necessary to use the GHG output as an indication of the carbon 
mitigation potential of policy portfolios. 
The data used in this analysis come from a variety of sources. Retail and 
wholesale electricity cost figures are compiled from EIA data, and represent those figures 
reported in the 2009 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO2009). Other sources of cost estimates 
include Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) data, Electric Power Monthly, 
and Natural Gas Week. Locational data of power plants come from EIA-860 database. 
Demand data come from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Form 714, which 
contains data on historical annual load-shapes for selected utilities. Emissions rates come 
from the Environmental Protection Agency’s ―Clean Air Markets‖ database (EPA, 2009). 
Resource information is primarily taken from the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation’s (NERC) Electric Supply & Demand database (NERC, 2009). The state 
policy data that inform the various policy scenarios come from each state’s enabling 
legislation, the Database for State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) 
(NC Solar Center, 2009), and supporting literature. 
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AURORAxmp databases are divided according to NERC regional boundaries, 
which necessitates that I draw a research sample at the region level. However, the 
research intent is to draw results that can be generalized to the national level. As a result, 
research efforts are focused on the Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC), 
which is the largest and most diverse of all NERC electric regions, and has the greatest 
generalizability potential. Much of the WECC is also actively involved in planning for 
future climate change policy at the regional level via the Western Climate Initiative; and 
multiple WECC states recently passed state-level legislation for climate action plan 
policies. The WECC includes 14 U.S. states, as well as Baja, Mexico, and Alberta and 
British Columbia, Canada. While the analysis is focused on the WECC, the electricity 
dispatch model still tracks transmission and distribution links between WECC and other 
NERC regions and, thereby, still captures all retail and wholesale electricity trades among 
regions. 
With an objective to track policy effects from state-specific policy portfolios, it is 
necessary to select states from within the WECC on which to model policy scenarios. 
Although the sample selection does not employ an advanced sampling methodology, the 
selection of states is guided by several criteria. First, I choose states based on the 
immediacy of the decarbonization policy issue in each state. This criterion requires that I 
select states that recently drafted climate action plans, the results of which recently or are 
currently informing policy debates over the adoption or revision of various energy 
policies.
3
 Second, I omit California from the selection process because California’s 
energy generation and policies make the state non-representative of other states. I 
additionally omit states that border California because California is the biggest importer 
in the country and, as a result, surrounding states’ exporting behavior may be non-
representative of average conditions. Third, I select states that have differences in energy 
resource potential, generation portfolios, and demand projections, so that results are 
based on a broader range of state-level electricity conditions. Finally, I select states that 
share a border, so as to monitor trade between the two states. Utah and Arizona match all 
of these criteria and are selected to serve as the research sample.  
Using these data, I build various policy scenarios. I begin with a business as usual 
case, which represents electricity dispatch decisions given current energy trends and in 
absence of any state policy legislation, save a national investment tax credit for wind and 
solar.
4
 The output of this case is hereafter referred to as the ―baseline‖. Next, I model a 
series of policy portfolio scenarios in Utah and Arizona, respectively, then across the 
entire WECC, and compare model results. Finally, I run the same policy portfolio 
scenarios first at the state level and then at the regional level, but this time include a 
national carbon price. Policy portfolios are assumed to become effective on January 1
st
, 
                                                          
3
 Utah drafted an advisory report on climate change policy options in 2007 (Utah Governor’s Blue Ribbon 
Advisory Report, 2007) subsequently passed RPS legislation in March of 2008 (NC Solar Center, 2010). 
Utah has also commissioned a report that explores the state’s carbon mitigation options (Gumerman and 
Daniels, 2009). Arizona drafted a climate action plan in 2006 (Arizona Climate Change Advisory Group, 
2006). Arizona passed RPS legislation well before the publication of their climate action plan, first adopted 
in 1999, but revised their RPS policy in 2006 from a renewable energy mandate of 1.1 percent of all 
generation by 2007 to 15 percent by 2025 (NC Solar Center, 2010).  
4
 These cost savings are factored into the fixed cost parameters of both wind and solar. 
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2010, and run through December 31
st
, 2030. All scenarios are run between 2006 and 
2035; but only data from 2010 and 2030 are extracted and reported.
5
  
Similar to other electricity dispatch models (Chen et al., 2007), AURORAxmp 
calculates electricity prices based on short-term supply curves that reflect marginal costs 
of operations.
6
 When one models a policy by forcing a resource online at a certain time 
(for instance, if one forces 100 MW of wind power online in 2010 as a result of an RPS 
policy), the overnight capital costs of that resource are not included in the electricity 
price. Yet it is unrealistic to believe that utilities will not have to pay these fixed costs and 
recover their investments over time via rate increases. To deal with this issue, I calculate 
the additional annual cost associated with all forced resources outside of the model, and 
then factor this additional cost into the retail price of electricity. For all new supply-side 
resources, I calculate the additional annual cost with the following equation: 
Costt = CCrt * CRRr,  
where CC is the total capital cost of the resource, r is the type of resource in year t, and 
CRR is the capital cost of recovery. The CRR is calculated with the following equation: 
CRRr = d/1-(1+d)
-n
, 
in which d is the discount rate and n is the number of years over which the investment is 
amortized.  
 
4. Modeling Parameters 
4.1 Baseline 
All generation capacity in the model is categorized as either existing capacity or a 
―new resource,‖ available for deployment if it is economically efficient to do so. Existing 
capacity is documented at the power plant level, and includes all generation facilities that 
are currently in operation or planned for deployment in future years. The new resource 
types and generating characteristics that are included in the model are listed in Table 1. 
All new generator characteristics are extracted from the AEO2009, and represent the 
average cost estimates and other performance characteristics for these energy resources in 
a typical region of the country. Because there is some variation in the manner in which 
different electric providers count expenses as either fixed or variable operations and 
maintenance (O&M), I apply an adjustment factor to these two variables. I take 20 
percent of the fixed O&M, spread over the assumed lifetime of the power plant, and add 
this value to the variable O&M. The remaining 80 percent is classified as fixed O&M.
7
  
I also assume a maximum number of energy system builds per year and in total in 
each state. These figures impose restrictions on the selection of energy systems based on 
other criteria, such as political or social feasibility. For instance, I restrict the model to 
one IGCC power plant build per year and per state, and two new IGCC power plants over 
the entire study period. The model may select IGCC as the most economically efficient 
                                                          
5
 This step is generally recommended for long-term electricity dispatch modeling, because it removes any 
―kinks‖ that might occur in early or late years of the iterative, dynamic optimization procedure. All cost and 
price data are in 2006-dollar values. 
6
 Note that in reality, in the WECC, electricity prices at the retail level are generally based on average costs, 
not marginal costs. If AURORAxmp instead based electricity prices on average costs, one might expect 
less volatility in hourly prices, and more stability in prices over on-peak and off-peak horizons. However, 
given that this analysis averages retail prices over an annual basis, the difference should be negligible. 
7
 This assumption, or calibration exercise, is made per advice from AURORAxmp’s management team. 
Without this adjustment, AURORAxmp dispatches plants more often than one would realistically observe.  
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new energy resource but it is improbable to assume that will be politically feasible to 
build more than one IGCC power plant per state; and so by limiting the maximum 
number of power plant builds, one can control the rate at which the model selects IGCC 
plants.
8
 
 
[Insert ―Table 1. New Resource Option Parameters included in Baseline Scenario‖ here] 
 
Despite the ability to control the number of new power plants, it is more difficult 
to specify when specific power plants that are already operational at the beginning of a 
study period will be retired. As a result of this complication, no retirement bounds are 
placed on already existing power plants.
9
 
Demand projections are determined exogenously, and manually entered into 
AURORAxmp. I use the default demand growth projections for Utah, Arizona, and all 
other states within the WECC. Utah’s annual demand growth rate is 1.8 percent and 
Arizona’s is 2.5 percent between 2010 and 2030. Both of these growth rates represent 
actual demand growth over the past five years, as documented in the AEO2009. The 
average annual growth rate in demand across the WECC is 2.0 percent.  
The baseline contains a number of additional assumptions as well. First, the price 
of GHG emissions is set to zero, which indicates that there are no restrictions on GHG 
emissions, and reflects current conditions. Second, I assume that SO2 emissions are 
regulated and capped, according to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Third, I assume 
that NOx is regulated according to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments as well. Finally, 
all states are modeled as energy-policy free; that is, no state has a pre-existing energy 
policy that could potentially increase renewable energy or energy efficiency, or decrease 
fossil fuels. 
 
4.2 Baseline Sensitivity Analysis 
I run a number of baseline sensitivity analyses to test the sensitivity of the model 
outputs to variations in primary fuel costs, technological improvements, and demand 
growth projections. The first two sensitivity analyses represent scenarios in which the 
prices of both natural gas and coal in the WECC region are higher; the first scenario 
assumes a 15 percent increase in natural gas and coal resource prices across the study 
period and the second scenario assumes a 25 percent increase. These scenarios attempt to 
account for the fact that many long-run electricity forecasts tend to underestimate the cost 
of natural gas, (Palmer and Burtraw, 2005) as well as coal.  
The third baseline sensitivity analysis represents cost improvements of renewable 
resources due to technological innovation. Given the nature of AURORAxmp’s linear 
optimization logic, the model cannot endogenously determine the cost of technologies 
that experience improvements due to learning and experience. To capture these 
improvements, I apply ―learning parameters‖ to the fixed operations and maintenance 
costs of wind, solar photovoltaic, landfill, and geothermal systems, and enter the new cost 
streams into the model as exogenous parameters. The learning parameters are extracted 
                                                          
8
 It is important to note, however, that these optimization bounds are rarely met. As is discussed in the 
Results section, the only restriction that is encountered is Arizona’s IGCC annual limit in one scenario run. 
9
 Each power plant that has already been declared destined for retirement or is well past its functional age, 
however, does have a specified retirement date in the model. All other plants are eligible for retirement 
based on the economic performance of the plant. 
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from the AEO2009 and include a one percent improvement in the cost of wind by 2025, 
twenty percent in solar, five percent in landfill, and ten percent in geothermal. Each 
percentage improvement parameter is a conservative figure, designated by the AEO2009 
as the minimum total learning by 2025 (EIA, 2009).  
The final set of sensitivity analyses adjusts demand growth rates for Utah and 
Arizona, respectively, because demand assumptions can have significant consequences 
on the performance of energy models. Because it is possible that the growth rates are 
either too low or too high, I run two demand growth sensitivity analyses for both of the 
states, which results in four additional sets of outputs. For these sensitivity analyses, I 
adjust the demand growth rate parameter by .3 above and below the AEO2009 
assumptions. 
 
4.3 Policy Portfolios 
As discussed above, each state traditionally chooses unique combinations of 
different policy instruments to include in their carbon mitigation portfolios. For the 
purposes of this analysis, I build a portfolio that includes policies that: 1) are found in 
most states’ climate action plans; 2) represent a range of different energy policy 
instruments; and 3) are modeled at the national level in supporting literature. Guided by 
these criteria, I include renewable portfolio standards, demand-side measures, tax 
incentives, and carbon capture and sequestration in the state portfolio scenarios. A 
description of each policy instrument, and a discussion of the parameters used to 
operationalize these instruments, is outlined below.  
 
4.3.1 Renewable Portfolio Standards 
A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requires that a minimum level of either a 
state’s overall electricity generating capacity or its retail sales must come from renewable 
energy. Typically, states mandate that a specific percentage of renewable energy must be 
deployed by a terminal year, e.g., 25 percent by 2025.
10
 States tend to select low 
renewable energy percentage benchmarks for the first few years of RPS operations, 
which allows utilities and private energy organizations to make initial investments and 
the long-term renewable energy credit market to develop. The standards then rise by a 
few percentage points each year until they hit their goal. Common eligible energy 
resources under RPS legislation include wind, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wave, 
tidal, ocean thermal, biomass, hydroelectric, geothermal, and waste recovery or waste 
heat capture energy. Some states allow all of these renewable energy sources, while 
others allow only a few.
11
 Non-voluntary RPS programs are currently active in 27 states 
and the District of Columbia. Nine of these states implemented their RPS program in 
2007 (NC Solar Center, 2009). 
                                                          
10
 Under the majority of state RPS programs, each utility’s obligation is tradable in the form of Renewable 
Energy Credits (RECs). Each credit of which a utility falls short is subject to charge. This analysis does not 
explicitly model REC transactions because renewable energy certificates do not exist in AURORAxmp’s 
dispatch logic. 
11
 Some states also allow energy efficiency or advanced coal generation to count toward their RPS 
requirements. 
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The RPS policy scenario in the present study is operationalized as a 20 percent of 
state generation
12
 renewable energy mandate by 2025. I assume that this percentage 
requirement will grow at a constant rate from zero percent on the eve of policy adoption, 
in year 2009, to 20 percent by 2025, and then remain constant at 20 percent from 2025 to 
2030. The benchmarks for each five-year increment are as follows: 
 1.25% by 2010 
 7.50% by 2015 
 13.75% by 2020 
 20% by 2025 
To determine the total amount of incremental Megawatt-hours of renewable 
energy needed on an annual basis, I take the baseline total generation for each year, 
multiply it by the percentage benchmark, and then subtract out existing renewable 
capacity from all baseline and previous year-RPS renewable energy sources. I then 
calculate the total system capacity needed for each renewable resource by taking the total 
renewable MWh needed from the previous step and dividing it by the product of the 
resources’ capacity factor and the total number of hours in a year. These steps are 
combined, and expressed with the following equation: 
[(Gn * RPSn)-Σ REn]/(CFi* 8760), 
where n is the year, G is the total Megawatt-hours of generation in year n, RPS is the 
percentage benchmark, RE is the total renewable energy that is deployed in the baseline, i 
is the fuel type, 8760 is the number of days in a year, and CF is the capacity factor for 
each fuel type. I assume a capacity factor of 36 percent for wind energy, based on a value 
that the Department of Energy found for commercial wind operations for turbines 
installed after 1998, and documented between 2004 and 2005 (DOE, 2008). 
This study assumes that 100 percent of all new generating capacity intended to 
meet RPS requirements—i.e., the renewable generating capacity needed beyond that 
which already exists in the baseline—will be met with wind energy.13 I consider the 
                                                          
12
 To date, there is no leading or consistently adopted RPS policy design (Wiser and Barbose, 2008). One 
of the many design features that vary across state RPS policies is whether the renewable energy percentage 
mandate applies to a utility’s retail sales or its generation and, additionally, whether the percentage mandate 
is based on a calculation of in-state sales or generation, or both in-state and out-of-state sales or generation. 
The present analysis calculates the RPS percentage requirements according to total state electricity 
generation, after adjustments as outlined in the text, which is the equivalent of an in-state plus out-of-state 
retail sales minus transmission and distribution losses. It is important to note that this assumption requires 
that more renewable energy is forced online in the model than if I instead calculate the mandated renewable 
energy using retail sales or exclusively in-state generation as a base for calculation. For states that are net 
exporters, the greater the difference between exports and imports, the greater would be the difference 
between the amount of renewables necessary for an RPS under the present specification and under an RPS 
based on retail sales specification. For states that are net importers, the difference between the amount of 
renewables needed under different specifications should be minimal, since most generation and sales occur 
in-state. 
13
 The assumption made in this analysis of 100 percent wind energy is mostly in keeping with past trends. 
Between 1998 and 2007, 93 percent of the total new renewable energy that was deployed in RPS states 
came from wind energy; the remaining four percent came from biomass, two percent from solar, and one 
percent from geothermal (Wiser and Barbose, 2008). Solar or distributed generation set-asides are, 
however, becoming more common; as of 2007, 12 states out of 26 with mandatory RPS policies had a solar 
or distributed generation set-aside of some type (Wiser and Barbose, 2008). One could make a claim, 
therefore, that the RPS modeled in this analysis should include other resources, such as solar or distributed 
generation. The intent of this modeling exercise, however, is not to accurately predict the exact renewable 
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following energy sources from the baseline as RPS-eligible: wind, solar, geothermal, 
biomass, hydroelectric, and municipal solid waste. In addition to these assumptions, it is 
also the case that no renewable energy credits are traded among states; each state must 
satisfy their own RPS mandates and cannot purchase them from neighboring states. 
After I calculate the total annual capacity of wind energy needed to satisfy the 
RPS requirements, I force this amount of capacity online throughout the study period. 
Because a RPS is a mandatory regulation, it is fair to assume that utilities will not decide 
whether or not they want to deploy new renewable energy units, they will instead be 
mandated to do so. As a result, the utilities will need to decide how to redistribute 
resources to comply with demand, availability, and fiscal constraints. I therefore force the 
renewable energy capacity online, as opposed to allow the optimization logic to choose 
renewable energy when it is cost-efficient. In calculating the annualized capital cost of 
RPS wind power, I assume a discount rate of 10 percent, which is appropriate for a 
private sector investment, and an investment payback period of 30 years. 
One would expect an RPS policy to reduce total carbon dioxide emissions, force 
the retirement of some natural gas plants and displace new natural gas capacity, since 
both natural gas and wind serve intermediate loads. 
 
4.3.2 Demand Side Management 
Demand side management (DSM) refers to any program or policy that alters 
electricity demand, either via changes in the pattern of electricity use or in the total 
quantity. A variety of policy instruments can be considered under the umbrella of DSM, 
including but not limited to the following: lighting standards, building codes and 
standards, energy efficiency portfolio standards, public benefit funds, weatherization 
programs, and loans, grants, and rebates for energy efficiency. States have adopted 
different combinations of these DSM instruments over the years. 
In the present study, I conceptualize a DSM policy as a gradual increase in the 
percentage of energy savings over time. I assume that the percentage of savings starts at 
one percent in 2010 and rises by one percentage point each year, until it hits 20 percent in 
2029. To operationalize this policy scenario, I convert these savings into changes in 
demand escalation. For instance, instead of a 1.8 percent growth in demand between year 
t and year t+1, as is the case for Utah’s baseline, Utah instead experiences a 0.7 percent 
demand growth in the DSM scenario.
 14
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
energy mix that each state or region will deploy as a result of an RPS, which would necessitate additional 
assumptions about the technical, political, and economic feasibility of various renewable energy sources in 
different states; instead, the objective is to simplify the modeling parameters and apply consistent scenario 
assumptions across states and regions for the sake of comparison and generalizability of trends. The author 
encourages readers to bear these simplifying assumptions in mind when interpreting model results. In 
particular, on should exhibit caution in the interpretation of cost estimates for scenarios that include RPS 
policies, since the costs may be lower than one would realistically observe, due to higher initial costs of 
solar energy and distributed generation relative to wind energy.  
14
 The assumption of 20 percent reduction employed in this analysis does not translate into a 20 percent 
reduction from 2010 demand by 2029. Instead, the percentage DSM savings are applied to the baseline 
demand projections on an annual basis so that, by 2029, a state will have demand that is 20 percent lower 
than the baseline 2029 demand. This distinction is important because the former conceptualization, a 20 
percent reduction from 2010 demand by 2029, would result in much larger demand savings—perhaps even 
unrealistic savings—than the latter conceptualization of demand savings. 
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Similarly to all forced supply-side resources, AURORAxmp does not include the 
cost of demand-side programs in the model. The annual cost of DSM programs, 
therefore, must be calculated outside of the model, and then factored into the retail cost of 
electricity. To perform this calculation, I assume that the cost of a DSM program is 3.4 
cents/kWh, a cost-effectiveness figure estimated by a Resources for the Future study 
(Gillingham et al., 2004) for DSM programs. Because it is reasonable to assume that the 
cost of DSM programs will rise after the lowest hanging demand-side fruit is exhausted, I 
assume that the price of DSM programs rises to 6.8 cents/kWh after 10 percent—half the 
savings—have been achieved, which occurs in 2019. I assume that all DSM program 
costs are paid in full during the year in which the DSM savings are realized. 
A DSM program will likely decrease total carbon emissions, and prolong the need 
for new power plant builds. 
 
4.3.3 Tax Incentives 
There are a variety of tax incentive mechanisms among which states can choose 
that alter the cost of alternative energy and, as a result, make alternatives more cost-
competitive with conventional energy sources. Tax incentives generally reduce the initial, 
or overnight, cost of an alternative energy system by a specific percentage. The most 
common tax incentive mechanisms include the personal income, sales, corporate income, 
and property tax incentives. Most states have at least one of these incentives currently in 
place. 
I build a tax incentive scenario in which a reduction of 35 percent of the overnight 
capital costs is applied to the following new renewable energy deployment options: wind, 
solar, geothermal, biomass, and municipal solid waste/landfill. The new overnight capital 
cost is then added to the other fixed 0&M costs, and the resulting estimate, the total fixed 
O&M, is entered into the model. Table 2 summarizes the changes in fixed cost 
parameters between the baseline and the tax incentive scenarios. 
 
[Insert ―Table 2. Fixed Operations and Maintenance Costs for Baseline and Tax Incentive 
Scenarios‖ here] 
 
Tax incentives will reduce the cost of renewable energy and, thereby, make 
renewable resources more cost-competitive with conventional fossil fuel resources. As a 
result of lower prices, one can predict that more renewable energy systems will be 
constructed and dispatched throughout the study period, which will displace, at least in 
part, the construction of new coal and natural gas systems, and reduce the total 
greenhouse gas emissions throughout the study period. 
 
4.3.4 Carbon Capture and Storage 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is the process of collecting carbon dioxide that 
is produced at power plants or during fossil fuel processing, compressing it for storage 
and transportation, and injecting it into deep underground geological layers. Carbon 
capture technologies are commercially viable in the petroleum processing industry and 
technologically proven for small-scale gas-fired and coal-fired boilers. Capture 
technologies are not yet demonstrated, however, for large-scale power plant applications 
(Rubin et al., 2007). The sequestration and storage aspect of CCS is demonstrated on a 
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large-scale in three separate countries (IPCC, 2005; Rubin et al., 2007). Despite the 
recent advances made in CCS technological development, a variety of regulatory and 
legal barriers continue to prohibit wide-scale deployment of CCS technologies. 
CCS policies are not typically formed at the state level, but are more conducive to 
regional or national level policymaking. Yet a variety of states have included CCS 
policies in their climate action plans. Utah, for instance, has identified CCS policies as a 
top priority option, which they describe as the following: 
 
Some of the key questions to be addressed in the development of a consistent 
regulatory framework for carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) are: immunity 
from potentially applicable criminal and civil environmental penalties; property 
rights, including the passage of title to CO2 (including to the government) during 
transportation, injection and storage; government-mandated caps on long-term 
CO2 liability; the licensing of CO2 transportation and storage operators, 
intellectual property rights related to CCS, and monitoring of CO2 storage 
facilities. Regulatory barriers may include revisiting the traditional least-cost/least 
risk regulatory standard or mitigating added risks and financing challenges of 
CCS projects with assured, timely cost-recovery (Utah Governor’s Blue Ribbon 
Advisory Report, 2007).  
  
For the purposes of the present analysis, a CCS policy is defined as that which 
removes the regulatory barriers to CCS deployment and defines a legal framework that 
monitors and regulates CCS developments. I assume that these efforts will eventually 
render CCS as technologically viable and available for widespread commercialization. I 
additionally assume that CCS will be deployed in conjunction with advanced, efficient 
fossil fuel operations, such as integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC-CCS) or 
natural gas combined cycle plants (NGCC-CCS), with cost and performance 
characteristics outlined in the AEO2009, and an 86 percent improvement in carbon 
emissions’ rate over conventional, non-CCS plants. I assume that both plants experience 
technological improvements throughout the study period, as is typical of most new 
generation technologies. To represent technological improvement, I reduce the overnight 
capital costs and heat rate of IGCC-CCS and NGCC-CCS plants, respectively, 
throughout the study period. Table 3 displays these assumptions.  
 
[Insert ―Table 3. Carbon Capture and Storage Technological Improvement Model 
Assumptions‖ here] 
 
This CCS ―policy,‖ therefore, is modeled as an electric generation resource 
option, which a utility in a CCS policy state can choose, among other resource options, to 
build and deploy. According to these assumptions, I build the CCS policy scenario by 
including IGCC-CCS and NGCC-CCS as new resource options. Beginning in 2012, these 
technologies become available—deployable on a commercial scale—but require eight 
years of permitting and construction time before the plant is up and running. Thus, the 
first year in which a CCS plant can dispatch power online is 2020. Table 4 shows the 
CCS plant characteristics, as entered in AURORAxmp. 
 
[Insert ―Table 4. Carbon Capture and Storage Policy Scenario Parameters‖ here] 
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Assuming that the cost and performance parameters render CCS technologies 
cost-competitive with other sources of electricity generation, one should expect CCS 
technologies to displace new coal and natural gas power plant builds, resulting in a 
reduction of total GHG emissions over the course of the study period. 
 
4.3.5 Policy Portfolios Scenarios 
I combine these four policy instruments into two policy portfolio scenarios. The 
first scenario is a ―strong‖ portfolio, in which I do not adjust for any overlap in policy 
objectives and merely combine and run all four instruments as-is. Under this scenario, 
one should expect more renewable energy deployment than that which is mandated by 
the RPS, since the tax incentive will encourage additional renewable energy dispatch. In 
the second scenario, the ―moderate‖ portfolio scenario, I adjust for overlap in renewable 
energy deployment. Under this moderate portfolio scenario, I subtract the renewable 
energy that is dispatched as a result of the tax incentives from the total amount of energy 
that I force online as a result of the RPS policy. The difference between the strong and 
moderate scenarios, therefore, is the amount of total wind energy that is forced online: the 
strong scenario has more wind energy and the moderate scenario has less. As explained 
above, I first model these two policy portfolio scenarios in isolated states, Utah and 
Arizona, respectively, and then model the portfolio scenarios across the entire WECC 
region.
15
  
In all state policy scenarios, only the specific state that is the unit of analysis, is 
assumed to have a policy portfolio. All surrounding states are modeled as though they do 
not have any energy policies, even if, in reality, energy policies exist in these states. This 
assumption is made so that states’ policy efforts can be analyzed in isolation, and the 
model results can be attributed to the isolates states’ policy efforts and not confounded by 
surrounding states’ policy actions. In the regional scenarios, all states within a region are 
assumed to have the same portfolio of energy policy instruments. 
 
4.4 Carbon Price Scenarios 
In the last series of runs, I add national carbon prices of $25/metric ton GHG 
equivalent and $50/metric ton GHG equivalent, respectively, and compare the results to 
the non-carbon price scenarios. Pre-carbon price policy adoption, I assume that the cost 
of carbon is zero dollars. Beginning in 2012, for the $25 carbon cost run I assume that the 
cost of carbon rises steadily from $1 to $15/metric ton GHG in the first year, and $15 to 
$25/metric ton GHG in the second year. Similarly, the $50 GHG cost run has an increase 
in the cost of carbon from $1 to $25/metric ton GHG in the first year, and from $25 to 
$50/metric ton GHG in the second year. Once the cost hits its maximum value, at $25/ 
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 One could additionally run a third series of model adjustments in which the amount of renewable energy 
that is forced online via an RPS is adjusted further for direct demand reductions from the DSM policy 
scenarios and indirect demand adjustments from the carbon price scenarios. However, recalling that this 
analysis assumes that RPS policies are based on total generation, as opposed to retail sales or electricity 
loads, a change in in-state demand still may not affect the total renewable energy mandate if states increase 
their exports as a result of in-state demand reductions. I decide, therefore, to restrict the output to only two 
series of model adjustments—the ―strong‖ and ―moderate‖ scenarios—to improve the focus of the results’ 
discussion.  
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metric ton GHG and $50/ metric ton GHG, respectively, it remains steady at that value 
throughout the duration of the study period.
16
 
I additionally run two carbon price sensitivity analyses that allow for the more 
realistic assumption that demand is elastic and will decrease in response to a rise in the 
price of electricity from a carbon price. In effort to capture these effects, I decrease 
demand growth rates across the entire WECC region. In the $25/metric ton GHG case, I 
cut demand growth rates by one-sixth, beginning in the first year in which a carbon price 
is imposed. In the $50/metric ton GHG case, I cut demand growth rates by one-fourth. 
The average growth rate across the WECC is 0.9 in the baseline scenario, and ranges 
from 0.77 and 0.55 in the $25/metric ton GHG sensitivity scenario and 0.7 to 0.61 in the 
$50/metric ton GHG sensitivity scenario. 
When emission costs are included in dispatch decisions, AURORAxmp adjusts 
variable costs for each energy resource according to the following equation: 
VOM = R * HR * P / 2x10
6
,  
where VOM is variable operations and maintenance costs for the energy resource 
(measured in $/MWh), R is the unit emissions rate (measured in lb/mmBtu), HR is the 
unit heat rate (measured in Btu/kWh), and P is the emission price (measured in $/Ton). 
A summary of modeling scenarios is presented in Table 5. 
 
5. Results of Scenario Analysis 
5.1 Baseline 
Figures 1 and 2 below display the mix of total generation resources in Utah and 
Arizona, respectively, between 2010 and 2030. Utah’s generation mix is heavily 
concentrated with coal, and grows increasing more so throughout the study period, from 
85.9 percent in 2010 to 90.5 percent in 2030. Utah also generates electricity using natural 
gas, hydroelectricity, and biomass. Natural gas generation declines throughout the study 
period, while the generation of hydroelectricity and biomass remain relatively steady. 
Although it is not visible in figure 1 below, Utah also has 23 MW of geothermal capacity, 
which it dispatches in 2010 and 2011, but retires by 2012. Utah has no nuclear energy. 
Utah adds no new generation capacity between 2010 and 2030 and, instead, slightly 
decreases generation, almost entirely via natural gas plant retirements. In order to satisfy 
in-state electricity demand, Utah decreases exports and slightly increases imports 
throughout the study period.  
Arizona’s generation mix is a bit more varied, with roughly one-third coal, one-
third natural gas, and one-third a combination of nuclear and hydroelectricity. Arizona 
also has solar photovoltaic and landfill in its generation mix, although in such minor 
concentrations that they are not visible in Figure 2. Arizona adds new generation from 
coal and natural gas early in the study period, beginning around 2016. By 2021, Arizona 
maintains a steady generation of coal but continues to increase natural gas generation to 
satisfy its rising electricity demand. Eventually, Arizona generates more natural gas than 
coal. Arizona also adds new biomass generation, although a relatively minor amount 
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 One could argue that these ―ramp-up‖ carbon price rates are too strong and, in reality, it would take 
several additional years for carbon price to ramp-up to its full value. It is possible that the assumptions 
made in the present analysis also affect the model outcomes; if, for instance, a state has a decade to ease 
into carbon price restrictions, it may pursue different electricity resource options than it does under the two-
year transition that is modeled in this analysis. 
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compared to the other energy resources. Both nuclear and hydroelectric generation 
remain steady throughout the study period. 
 
[Insert ―Figure 1. Utah Baseline Generation‖ here] 
[Insert ―Figure 2. Arizona Baseline Generation‖ here] 
 
Arizona generates significantly more electricity than Utah. In 2020, Arizona 
generates roughly 37 percent more electricity than Utah. By 2030, Arizona generates 28 
percent more electricity. In the beginning of the study period, Arizona and Utah generate 
roughly the same total amount of coal, although the percentage of coal out of the total 
respective generation mix is not even.  
Table 6 presents additional model results. Total GHG emissions remain relatively 
steady in Utah, around 41 million metric tons. Arizona’s emissions rise throughout the 
study period, from roughly 59 million metric tons in 2010, to 69 in 2020, and to 80 in 
2030. The average electricity price is roughly equivalent across the two states, which is 
expected given the optimization and electricity trading logic, as discussed in the previous 
section, both of which rise by over 150 percent between 2010 and 2030. Both Arizona 
and Utah are net electricity exporters. As mentioned above, Utah’s exports drop 
significantly over the course of the study period and its imports rise slowly; by 2030, 
Utah’s exports and imports nearly converge. Arizona also demonstrates decreasing 
exports and increasing imports, albeit to a lesser degree than Utah. 
 
[Insert ―Table 6. Baseline Scenario Summary Results for Utah and Arizona, 2020 and 
2030‖ here] 
 
 
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Cost Parameters 
The results of the baseline sensitivity analyses are presented in Table 7 and Table 
8. Beginning with the first sensitivity analysis, the increase in the price of coal makes 
both states produce slightly less of it; although neither state retires any coal plants. As a 
result of a 15 percent increase in natural gas and coal, respectively, both states generate 
more natural gas power and less coal, and increase both exports and imports, albeit only 
slightly. These results reveal that the increase in the cost of coal offsets the effect of an 
increase in natural gas and so, despite the higher cost of natural gas, these states replace 
some coal generation with natural gas. The retail price of electricity rises accordingly. 
Neither state, however, replaces coal or natural gas with renewable energy; therefore, the 
increase in fossil fuel price was not enough to make renewable energy cost-competitive 
across comparable load level, i.e. base load, intermediate, or peak. 
Utah responds to a 25 percent cost increase in natural gas and coal with a 
reduction of both sources of fossil fuel, and a resulting overall decrease in total 
generation and GHG emissions. Utah also reduces both exports and imports, and 
experiences an increase in the retail price of electricity. With an effect similar to the 15 
percent cost increase scenario, Arizona decreases coal generation, slightly increases 
natural gas generation, decreases both exports and imports, and experiences a rise in the 
price of electricity. 
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[Insert ―Table 7. Utah Baseline Sensitivity Analysis Summary Results, 2030‖ here] 
[Insert ―Table 8. Arizona Baseline Sensitivity Analysis Summary Results, 2030‖ here] 
 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Technological Innovation Parameters 
In the technological innovation sensitivity analysis, Utah and Arizona 
demonstrate consistent, albeit complex trends. In the case of Utah, the innovation-based 
renewable energy cost parameters are not significant enough to induce the state to build 
new renewable capacity, which is not surprising given that Utah does not build any new 
capacity in the baseline scenario either. The technological innovation parameters do, 
however, cause surrounding WECC states to increase landfill/MSW and wind energy, 
and retire some older coal and natural gas plants. These resource changes result in a 
decrease of surrounding states’ exports, which, in turn, affects Utah’s imports and causes 
Utah to retain some of the generation that it would otherwise export. Utah also responds 
to these changes in imported supply by ramping up its natural gas generation by roughly 
200,000 MWh. In the case of Arizona, the technological innovation cost adjustments 
make landfill energy more cost-competitive with natural gas; as a result, Arizona builds 
more landfill/MSW and less natural gas in the technological innovation scenario, relative 
to the baseline scenario. Arizona does not replace natural gas with landfill/MSW on a 
one-for-one basis and so it does not have as much excess generation to export to 
surrounding states, including Utah. In summary, both states decrease inter-state 
electricity trades as a result of the technological innovation sensitivity analysis. 
 
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Demand Parameters 
A higher rate of demand growth causes Utah to increase coal and natural gas 
generation, which results in an increase of GHG emissions and an increase in the price of 
electricity. Utah does not, however, build any new power plants to provide for this 
greater demand; besides ramping up coal and natural gas plants, Utah reduces its exports 
and increases its imports. By 2030, Utah is a net importer of electricity in the demand 
growth adjustment sensitivity scenario. A lower demand growth rate for the state of Utah 
results in a very slight decrease in coal generation, but an increase in natural gas 
generation from existing plants. Total generation rises, therefore, as do GHG emissions 
and the price of electricity, despite the decrease in in-state demand. Utah exports the 
additional generation and, as a result, exports increase significantly in this scenario 
relative to the baseline. Imports decrease as well, which makes Utah the largest net 
exporter in this scenario, relative to all Utah baseline scenarios.  
As a result of a lower rate of demand growth, Arizona builds and deploys half as 
much biomass generation and slightly decreases coal generation. Arizona’s exports 
increase and its imports decrease. Both GHG emissions and the price of electricity 
decrease as a result of Arizona’s demand growth adjustment sensitivity scenario. With a 
higher demand growth rate, Arizona increases total generation, mostly from new natural 
gas units, which increases GHG emissions and the price of electricity. Given additional 
new resource capacity that is greater than Arizona’s in-state needs, Arizona increases 
exports; imports remain roughly the same. 
It is evident that resource dispatch decisions and export-import behavior are 
sensitive to demand parameter assumptions; export-import and dispatching decisions, in 
turn, affect total generation and GHG emissions. The direction of the relationships among 
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these variables is difficult to predict a priori. For instance, one cannot assume that just 
because demand decreases, total generation and GHG emissions will decrease. Instead, it 
may the case that, due to a decrease in demand growth, the price of excess natural gas or 
coal generation falls, and, as a result, surrounding states will demand more of the first 
state’s natural gas or coal generation due to the difference in the marginal costs of 
electricity between the two states. 
 
5.5 Policy Portfolio Scenarios 
As discussed in section 4.3, each states’ policy portfolio includes an RPS, a DSM 
program, renewable energy tax incentives, and a CCS policy. Portfolio policies were 
modeled as ―isolated state‖ scenarios and as ―regional coordination‖ scenarios with two 
variants of policy strength, ―strong‖ and ―moderate‖. Refer back to section 4.3.5 and 
Table 5 for an explanation of these scenario assumptions. The results of these portfolio 
analyses in year 2030 are summarized in the tables below.
17
 To focus the conversation on 
broader trends, I only present results from the strong policy portfolios in the 
corresponding graphs. I do, however, present the moderate portfolio results in the 
summary tables for the sake of comparison. Overall, moderate and strong portfolios 
produced similar results. 
 
5.5.1 Policy Portfolio Scenarios: Utah 
Beginning with Utah’s results in Table 9, the top two rows reveal that each 
portfolio scenario reduces GHG emissions and increases the retail price of electricity in 
Utah relative to baseline projections. The two isolated state scenarios have slightly lower 
emissions than the baseline. The regional coordination scenarios have lower GHG 
emissions than both the isolated state scenarios and the baseline. The strong regional 
coordination portfolio scenario has a lower 2030 retail price of electricity than the 
isolated state scenario. Figures 3 and 4 present these two variables, Utah’s GHG 
emissions and retail electricity price over time.  
 
[Insert ―Table 9. Utah Portfolio Scenario Results in 2030‖ here] 
[Insert ―Figure 3. Utah GHG Emissions‖ here] 
[Insert ―Figure 4. Utah Retail Price of Electricity‖ here] 
 
 These graphs reveal that the Utah-only policy portfolio has minor carbon 
mitigation effects. Regional policy portfolio coordination, however, has a relatively 
substantial effect on carbon mitigation. The isolated state scenario requires the exact 
same total Utah investment as the regional coordination scenario—both the state and 
regional scenarios have the same new RPS wind resources, demand curtailment, policy 
incentives, and CCS technology options—yet the total GHG savings of the two scenarios 
significantly differ. The greater ―bang-for-your-buck‖ of Utah’s dollars associated with 
the regional coordination scenario is evident in Figure 4, which demonstrates that both 
portfolio scenarios will increase the total retail price of electricity in Utah, but the 
isolated state portfolio will increase retail prices more than $10/MWh over the regional 
coordination portfolio by 2030. Table 10 below shows the difference between GHG 
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 I also modeled each individual policy in isolated states and across the region. Results of the individual 
policy scenarios are not presented in this analysis but can be obtained via personal request. 
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emissions in the baseline scenario and GHG emissions in the state and regional scenarios, 
respectively. These estimates reveal that, for the same investment from the state of Utah, 
a regional portfolio has 2.7 times the decarbonization potential than a state portfolio in 
2020, and up to 6.8 times by 2030.
18
 If one considers cumulative GHG emissions over the 
entire study period, the regional coordination portfolio has roughly 5.1 times greater 
decarbonization potential for the state of Utah as the isolated state portfolio.
19
 
 
[Insert ―Table 10. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline and Portfolio Scenarios, 
Utah‖ here] 
 
Which factors contribute to the greater decarbonization potential of regional 
portfolios for the case of Utah? Returning to Table 8, other model results lend insights on 
this issue. As a result of all portfolio scenarios, Utah experiences a reduction in total in-
state electricity demand, as one would expect given its DSM efforts. Utah also uses less 
natural gas, and even retires a few natural gas plants, as a result of the new wind 
generation. Hydroelectricity and biomass remain unaffected, relative to the baseline 
scenario. Yet total generation rises in all four scenarios. In the case of the isolated state 
scenarios, coal generation rises rather substantially; the combination of new wind power 
and increased coal generation—note that Utah does not actually build new coal plants, it 
simply ramps up generation at existing plants—causes total generation to rise. It is only 
the retirement of natural gas plants that causes the isolated state portfolio scenarios to 
experience a reduction—albeit, recall, minor—in GHG emissions vis-à-vis the baseline 
scenario.  
If electricity demand in Utah, however, is 20 percent below a business as usual 
case, why would Utah generate more coal power than it would in absence of a policy 
portfolio? The reason is that Utah can export their relatively inexpensive coal-based 
electricity to neighboring states, a phenomenon referred to as ―carbon leakage‖ in the 
literature. In absence of their own renewable energy, energy efficiency, or carbon dioxide 
legislation, neighboring states will take advantage of the opportunity to purchase Utah’s 
excess coal. In the case of the regional coordination scenario, however, neighboring 
states also have to meet demand-side and supply-side regulations of their own and, 
therefore, purchase less of Utah’s excess fossil fuel generation. These trends are evident 
in Figure 5, which displays net exports minus imports over time. The baseline scenario 
experiences converging values for exports and imports. Both the state and regional 
scenarios experience an increase in exports and a decrease in imports, relative to the 
baseline. The isolated state scenario has the largest net exports (exports minus imports) 
difference, which indicates that Utah is the biggest exporter of electricity when it is the 
only state with a policy portfolio. 
 
[Insert ―Figure 5. Utah Net Exports-Imports‖ here] 
 
5.5.2 Policy Portfolio Scenarios: Arizona 
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 These decarbonization potential estimates are not to be confused with cost-effectiveness estimates.  
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 It is important to note that a regional scenario will result in a greater bang for Utah’s buck but will also 
require surrounding states to make policy investments as well.  
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Arizona’s results are summarized in Table 11. As this table reveals, all four policy 
scenarios reduce GHG emissions significantly below baseline projections. Similarly to 
Utah, the regional coordination scenarios result in the lowest total GHG emissions. There 
are, however, only minor differences between GHG emission savings in the isolated state 
portfolios and the regional coordination portfolios. The retail price of electricity also rises 
in all four cases but the strong regional coordination scenario has the lowest price by 
2030. Figures 6 and 7 display Arizona’s GHG emissions and retail price over time, 
respectively, as a result of the portfolio scenarios.  
 
[Insert ―Table 11. Arizona Portfolio Scenario Results in 2030‖ here] 
[Insert ―Figure 6. Arizona GHG Emissions‖ here] 
[Insert ―Figure 7. Arizona Retail Price of Electricity‖ here] 
 
 
Figure 6 demonstrates that the regional portfolio has slightly lower GHG 
emissions throughout the study period, with the exception of the years between 2026 and 
2028. The retail price of electricity in the regional scenario is, however, consistently 
lower than it is in the state scenario, as displayed in Figure 7. Table 12 provides 
Arizona’s decarbonization potential factors. The regional coordination policy is 1.1 times 
more effective at reducing GHG emissions—per Arizona dollar spent on policy 
portfolios—than the state portfolio, which is the case at 2020, 2030, and cumulatively 
across the entire study period.  
 
[Insert ―Table 12. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline and Portfolio Scenarios, 
Arizona‖ here] 
 
 These factors of difference are based on the premise that both the state and 
regional scenarios will require the same policy expenditures made by the state of Arizona 
but will have different effects on total GHG emissions. The policy costs are factored into 
the retail price of electricity; but the retail price also includes other investment decisions 
made throughout the study period. It is instructive to consider, therefore, why the isolated 
state scenario results in a higher electricity price than the regional coordination scenario, 
despite the small difference in total GHG emissions. It is additionally important to 
consider why Utah has such a significant difference between regional and state scenarios 
yet Arizona’s difference is minor. 
 Returning to Table 11, it is evident that Arizona is forced to make more complex 
resource decisions than Utah as a result of the policy scenarios. Whereas Utah has 
relatively steady demand and ample coal resources to satisfy its base load, Arizona has an 
increasing demand growth rate and needs to build new power plants throughout the study 
period to satisfy this demand. In the baseline scenario, Arizona primarily builds new 
natural gas plants to satisfy increasing demand, but also builds coal, biomass, and landfill 
generating units. In the policy scenarios, Arizona is forced to make new investment 
decisions regarding which resources to build. Figures 8, 9, and 10 display which 
decisions Arizona makes.  
 
[Insert ―Figure 8. Arizona New Generation‖ here]       
[Insert ―Figure 9. Arizona Generation, State‖ here] 
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[Insert ―Figure 10. Arizona Generation, Regional‖ here] 
 
 Collectively, these graphs reveal that Arizona reduces total generation as a result 
of the policy scenarios. This reduction in generation is a significant factor in Arizona’s 
large GHG emissions savings across all policy scenarios. Arizona still has to build new 
generation to satisfy rising demand, which it does with new coal and RPS wind. The new 
wind generation entirely displaces the new natural gas builds that occur in the baseline 
scenario. Arizona still needs to satisfy growing base load demand, however, which it 
cannot do exclusively with wind power. The wind that Arizona deploys allows the state 
to postpone the construction of new coal plants in both the state and regional scenarios, 
until it eventually needs to build the additional base load coal generation. Once Arizona 
builds these coal plants, it has excess coal-based energy, which it can then export to 
surrounding states until Arizona requires the entire load for itself.  
 Arizona has to build new coal power plants earlier in the isolated state scenario 
because it cannot import as much base load generation from other states. Once 
surrounding states have their own portfolio policies, as is the case with the regional 
coordination scenarios, they have excess base load coal generation—a small amount of 
which is from IGCC-CCS—to sell to Arizona, which allows Arizona to further postpone 
the construction of new coal plants until 2025. Beginning in 2026, Arizona has excess 
coal power, generated with the most advanced and efficient coal technologies, which it 
sells to surrounding states. 
These trends are evident in the export-import graph below. Both policy scenarios 
cause Arizona to export more power, relative to the baseline, over the course of the study 
period. Imports rise in the regional coordination scenario, beginning around 2016, exactly 
when Arizona postpones its first coal plant build. Imports fall again and exports rise 
when Arizona builds its regional coordination scenario coal plant in 2025. Between 2026 
and 2028, Arizona exports more coal power in the regional scenario than in the state 
scenario. Save these years, Arizona has a higher net export-import value in the isolated 
state portfolio scenarios, which are the only years in which the regional portfolio is more 
cost-effective than the state portfolio. 
 
[Insert ―Figure 11. Arizona Net Exports-Imports‖ here] 
 
5.6 Carbon Price Scenarios 
 The final set of models combine portfolio with carbon price scenarios. The results 
from the strong regional portfolios combined with the carbon price scenarios are 
presented in Table 13 and Table 14. These tables also include the demand growth 
sensitivity scenarios. 
 
[Insert ―Table 13. Utah Carbon Price Portfolio Results, 2030‖ here] 
[Insert ―Table 14. Arizona Carbon Price Portfolio Results, 2030‖ here] 
 
 The carbon price scenarios produce predictable results: the price of electricity 
rises; GHG emissions fall; total generation decreases in all cases, save the Utah $25 GHG 
scenario; and renewable energy deployment increases and displaces carbon-intensive 
fossil fuels. A carbon price of $25/metric ton GHG causes both states to make relatively 
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small reductions in coal generation and large reductions in natural gas generation. A 
carbon price of $50/metric ton GHG has the opposite effect: major coal reductions and 
minor natural gas reductions, as is the case for Arizona, or natural gas additions, as is the 
case for Utah.  
 In the low carbon price scenario, Utah increases total generation; this increase is 
due to new RPS wind and the ramping up of Utah’s geothermal operations. Utah also 
reduces coal generation, although not substantially, as well as natural gas, and increases 
exports and decreases imports. The price of carbon is significant enough in the high price 
scenario to cause Utah to deploy new biomass and landfill energy, and cut total coal 
generation nearly in half. Given that natural gas is the least carbon intensive fossil fuel, 
and also has the ability to serve as base load power, Utah builds new natural gas plants in 
the high carbon price scenario to replace a portion of its coal-generated base load. In 
total, Utah generation decreases, imports increase, and exports decrease in order for Utah 
to provide enough electricity to meet its consumers’ electricity demands at minimal cost. 
These conditions make the retail cost of electricity rise. 
 In Arizona’s low carbon price scenario, the state retires a substantial amount of 
coal generation, but replaces much of it with new IGCC-CCS and sub-critical scrubbed 
pulverized coal units. Arizona also retires more than half of its natural gas plants and 
replaces them with new renewable energy systems, including biomass, landfill, and RPS 
wind. The high carbon price causes Arizona to take more drastic measures: it retires over 
half of its coal plants; replaces a fraction of the coal with IGCC-CCS; decreases natural 
gas and replaces a portion of that power with renewable energy generation; and increases 
imports.  
 Figures 12 and 13 display each state’s total GHG emission savings, relatively to 
baseline values, as a result of the portfolio and carbon price scenarios. These graphs 
demonstrate that carbon prices, coupled with portfolio policies, have significant potential 
to reduce GHG emissions over the long run, given the parameter assumptions made in 
this analysis. Beginning around 2015, a carbon price of $50/metric ton GHG and a 
regional coordination portfolio cuts Utah’s emissions by almost one-half, and Arizona’s 
emissions by one-third.  
 
[Insert ―Figure 12. Utah Carbon Price Scenarios‖ here] 
[Insert ―Figure 13. Arizona Carbon Price Scenarios‖ here] 
 
5.6.1 Carbon Price Sensitivity Analyses 
The demand sensitivity scenarios represent a decrease in the rate of demand 
growth across all WECC states, which should more realistically capture the elasticity of 
demand that accompanies a carbon price. The sensitivity results once again highlight the 
intricacies of state level electricity dynamics, in which states make different dispatch 
decisions based on each state’s mix of generation resources, its export and import 
constraints, and the activities made in surrounding states. Vis-à-vis the baseline scenarios, 
both Utah’s and Arizona’s outputs from the sensitivity scenarios are consistent with those 
from the carbon price scenarios, as outlined above. When one instead compares the 
sensitivity scenarios with the carbon price scenarios, a couple of differences are worth 
noting. First, a lower rate of demand growth leads both states to cut back on the amount 
of new renewable generation, particularly biomass and landfill, that each needs to build. 
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Arizona also cuts back on new coal power plants. Second, given that there is less new 
generation in WECC states but there is still a need for electric supply that can match 
demand in these states, both Utah and Arizona ramp up generation from their natural gas 
plants. Utah also increases coal and geothermal generation, although not significantly. 
Both states find it advantageous to increase their already existing capacity—primarily 
from less carbon-intensive fuel sources—instead of building new generation. Third, some 
of this increase in already-existing generation is to satisfy in-state demand and the rest is 
for out-of-state demand. In states with relatively low demand and high capacity, such as 
Utah, net exports are the greatest. Utah is able to significantly increase exports and 
decrease imports in the $25 carbon price with demand sensitivity scenario. Utah’s total 
generation is actually higher in the demand sensitivity scenarios than it is in the carbon 
price scenarios because it is able to deploy this already-existing generation and sell it to 
surrounding states; although this results in a greater amount of GHG emissions and a 
higher retail price of electricity in Utah. Given that Arizona has less existing capacity to 
ramp up, and also cuts back on the new capacity that it builds, Arizona needs to import a 
greater amount of generation in the $25 carbon price with demand sensitivity scenario. 
Finally, both states cut back on new power plant builds, and decrease both imports and 
exports, as a result of the $50 carbon price with demand sensitivity scenario. 
 
5.6.2 Regional Models 
I additionally modeled a series of carbon price and portfolio scenarios at the 
regional level to track the differences in carbon mitigation effects of various energy and 
climate policies. Figure 14 presents the summary findings. WECC greenhouse gas 
emissions increase throughout the study period in the baseline scenario. The $50/metric 
ton GHG scenario causes the WECC to experience two years of rapid transition, or a 
tighten-the-belt period, in which it must quickly shift from carbon intensive fuels to more 
efficient and less carbon-intensive sources. After those two years, emissions continue to 
rise at a rate that is similar to, if not slightly smaller, than the baseline scenario. In the 
presence of a coordinated regional or national energy policy portfolio, but without a price 
on carbon, the WECC is able to roughly stabilize emissions at 2010 levels and generate a 
―stabilization triangle‖ (refer to the area above the red line in figure 14; Pacala and 
Socolow, 2004). The combination of the energy policy and the climate policy—the 
regional portfolio and the carbon price—causes the WECC to once again tighten its belt 
for a few years, but also has the combined effect of a change in the overall rate of GHG 
emissions growth. The new rate of growth is close to zero and, at times, slightly negative. 
These results confirm that both energy portfolio policies and climate policies have the 
potential to reduce GHG emissions significantly; but, given the specifications of the 
present analysis, neither is as effective in isolation as they are when combined. 
 
[Insert ―Figure 14. WECC GHG Emissions‖ here] 
 
5.7 GHG Emissions: Combined Scenarios 
  The GHG emission savings from all strong isolated state, regional coordination, 
and GHG price modeling scenarios are included in Table 15. The values in this table 
represent the difference between baseline GHG emissions for each respective area and 
the GHG emissions from each scenario. This table reveals that, despite the presence of 
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carbon leakage, which makes the isolated state scenarios less effective at reducing carbon 
emissions in each respective state, some of the leakage is offset by GHG emission 
savings in other WECC states. These offsets do demonstrate that state level policy 
portfolios can produce some GHG savings outside of the state that implements the policy 
portfolio; however, additional savings are not great enough to improve significantly the 
decarbonization potential of isolated state policy portfolios, relative to regional 
coordination policy efforts. Table 16 provides additional insights into the differences 
between isolated state and regional coordinated policy efforts. This table presents 
program costs—the costs necessary to implement all policies within a portfolio, based on 
the assumptions presented in section 4—divided by GHG savings for the isolated state 
and regional coordination scenarios.
20
 The table reveals that isolated state policy 
portfolios cost substantially more per ton of GHG saved than regional coordination policy 
portfolios. Due to the offset of some carbon leakage at the WECC-wide level, program 
costs per GHG emissions are slightly lower when one considers the region as a whole. 
 
[Insert ―Table 15. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline and Portfolio Scenarios, 
All Scenarios‖ here] 
 
[Insert ―Table 16. Program Costs (in $/GHGe ton saved)‖ here] 
 
 
6. Discussion 
  Results from the combined set of analyses confirm that: 1) spreadsheet 
projections of the climate mitigation effects of state energy policy efforts are not 
adequate; and 2) national level policy analyses—focused on both single and portfolio 
policies—cannot be generalized to the state level. Regarding the former, the present 
results reveal that the electricity sector cannot be captured easily in a linear spreadsheet 
projection, in which tracking state-by-state electricity trade exchanges, transmission 
constraints, and utility cost minimization decisions is immensely difficult. Regarding the 
latter, all national level modeling analyses reviewed above demonstrate the potential cost-
effectiveness of policy efforts that are heterogeneous and continuous across states. 
Previous national level findings are akin to the regional level results generated in the 
present study, which conclude that a coordinated policy strategy has significant carbon 
mitigation potential. In short, both state level spreadsheets and national modeling 
projections overestimate the effectiveness of state energy policy portfolios on carbon 
mitigation because they do not account for—or have the resolution to identify—changes 
in inter-state exporting behavior, the potential for carbon leakage, the retirement and 
building of new power plants, or changes in the relative price of electricity between states 
as a result of policy variation across state borders. 
 A summary of the model results is as follows. State energy policy portfolios have 
the potential to reduce GHG emissions over the long run. Coordinated energy policy 
portfolio efforts, as facilitated across multiple states, a region, or the nation, can produce 
minor (e.g. Arizona) to significant (e.g. Utah) improvements in the decarbonization 
potential of state policy actions. The difference in decarbonization potential between 
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 Note that this estimate only includes direct program costs, and not indirect costs associated with new 
resources that are built as a result of the policy portfolios, or other indirect costs.    
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isolated state policies and larger, more coordinated policy efforts is due to in large part to 
carbon leakage, which is the export of carbon intensive fossil fuel-based electricity across 
state lines. 
 The difference between the GHG mitigation potential of state efforts versus 
larger, coordinated efforts depends on the individual circumstances of each state. The 
present study considered two states, Utah and Arizona, and identified which factors 
contributed to the states’ GHG savings over time. In the case of Utah, which has a low 
demand growth rate and an abundance of coal generation, an isolated state policy 
portfolio causes Utah to decrease natural gas generation and export all excess coal 
generation to neighboring states. A regional coordination portfolio, on the other hand, 
reduces the neighboring states’ demand for inexpensive base load power, and Utah is 
forced to retire some of its older, less efficient coal power plants. The difference in 
decarbonization-effectiveness between the two scenarios, therefore, is large. In the case 
of Arizona, which has a high rate of electricity demand growth and a variety of different 
electricity resources, both an isolated state and a regional coordination portfolio cause 
Arizona to make significant changes to its resource portfolio mix. Both portfolio 
scenarios force Arizona to reduce total generation and delay new fossil fuel power plant 
builds. The regional coordination portfolio has greater decarbonization potential because 
Arizona builds less new coal generation, and thereby has lower carbon leakage, relative 
to the isolated state scenario. 
 It is additionally instructive to consider the behavior of the individual policy 
instruments that are included in the energy portfolios. First, the RPS policy increased 
wind generation, which tended to displace new or replace existing natural gas generation. 
The scenarios in this analysis confirm that an RPS policy can effectively increase 
renewable energy deployment, but it has limited ability to control fossil fuel generation, 
reduce demand, or control GHG emissions, as the literature has recently discussed (Rabe, 
2008; Carley, 2009). It is important to note, however, that an RPS policy may have a 
greater effect on fossil fuel generation and GHG emissions if the renewable energy that is 
deployed as a result of an RPS is from solar or biomass, since these energy resources 
have the ability to serve base loads and, thus, replace coal generation. Second, DSM 
policies were found to decrease in-state electricity demand, but, as was the case with 
Utah, not necessarily cause total in-state production to decrease accordingly.  
 Third, tax incentives of a 35 percent capital cost reduction had minimal effects on 
total renewable energy generation in all non-carbon price policy scenarios. Tax incentives 
did not affect Utah’s dispatch behavior, but they did cause Arizona to deploy extra 
landfill instead of new fossil fuel generation. These results reveal that a 35 percent capital 
cost tax incentive is not enough to make most renewable resources cost-competitive with 
conventional energy sources. With an incentive, landfill energy is able to compete with 
other new resources, but not existing resources. In the combined carbon price and 
portfolio scenarios, the tax incentive helps improve the cost-competitiveness of landfill, 
geothermal, and biomass resources.  
 Finally, the CCS policy had noteworthy results. No state in the WECC built 
NGCC-CCS technologies in any of the policy scenarios. Utah did not deploy a power 
plant with CCS technology; but this is not surprising, given that Utah had no need to add 
extra base load generation at any time during the study period. Arizona deployed IGCC-
CCS generation in the isolated state scenarios, beginning in 2030, after the state 
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exhausted its IGCC with no CCS and scrubbed sub-critical pulverized coal power plant 
builds. These trends indicate that IGCC with no CCS and sub-critical pulverized coal 
power plants are preferred to IGCC-CCS in the absence of a carbon price. Arizona did 
not deploy any IGCC-CCS in the regional coordination policies, although surrounding 
states did. This result is due to the timing of Arizona’s power plant construction needs, 
and the lack of overlap between its needs and the availability of CCS technologies. In the 
high carbon price and regional coordination portfolio scenario, 100 percent of Arizona’s 
new generation capacity was supplied by IGCC-CCS. These collective results reveal that, 
given current EIA cost and performance characteristics, IGCC-CCS technologies have 
the potential to be cost-competitive and more than carbon-competitive with other coal 
generating units, but only in the presence of carbon restrictions. Scenario results indicate 
that IGCC-CCS will not realize this potential, however, until 2027 or beyond. 
 The final results of this analysis revealed that energy policy portfolios have 
carbon mitigation potential, and that larger, coordinated policy efforts have enhanced 
potential. Results also confirmed that a carbon price of $50/metric ton GHG can generate 
substantial carbon savings. Although both policy options—energy policy portfolio or a 
carbon price—are effective at reducing GHG emissions, neither is as effective alone as 
when the two strategies are combined. These results are, however, contingent on the 
assumptions and specifications of this modeling exercise. 
Returning to the discussion of carbon leakage, this analysis is by no means the 
first to document this phenomenon. Many studies have used this term to classify the 
migration of carbon-intensive firms or industries from regions of carbon regulation to 
those without regulation. In other words, as a result of a climate policy, emissions 
increase outside of the policy-enforcing region. Numerous examples of international 
emissions leakages associated with cap-and-trade policies have emerged in recent years. 
Rabe (2008) has identified the problem of carbon leakages in the U.S. as well, which 
accompany the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Rabe and Bushnell and his 
colleagues (Bushnell et al., 2007) extend the notion of carbon leakages, or ―reshuffling‖ 
as Bushnell et al. refer to it, to include the transfer of relatively inexpensive electricity 
between regulated and non-regulated areas as a result of emissions’ regulations. The 
consequences of this type of carbon leakage is that it increases the price of electricity—
the incidence of which is more often than not passed along to the consumer—and costs 
the government financial resources that could be used for other public purposes, all for 
minor or potentially negligible savings of global greenhouse gas emissions. As Rabe 
(2008) explains, ―the impact of significant leakage could be to neutralize any potential 
carbon reduction of RGGI and even create substantial sinks that could accentuate the 
attractiveness of electricity produced in nonregulated states and provinces.‖ In keeping 
with these observations, both the European Union and RGGI have recently raised this 
concern, and facilitated working groups to study the extent of the problem and ways in 
which it can be addressed (RGGI, 2007; EU, 2009).  
The supporting literature to date has focused exclusively on the climate policy-
carbon leakage connection. The present study additionally identifies the connection 
between energy policies and carbon leakages, and the tendency for emissions’ regulated 
states to transfer relatively inexpensive fossil fuel generation to non-regulated states. 
Thereby, despite the efforts made —and costs incurred—to reduce GHG emissions by the 
regulated state, emissions in that state may not decrease much at all. These findings are 
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pertinent because U.S. climate change efforts are, to date, primarily state-run energy 
policy efforts, and the likelihood that leakage is already present is high. It is possible that 
states that appear to be U.S., and even global, leaders in climate change efforts may have 
a minimal, if not a negligible, effect on global greenhouse gas emissions.  
In the continued absence of national climate change legislation, the cost-
effectiveness of state decarbonization policies can be improved with efforts to coordinate 
energy and climate policy action across state borders, via either state partnership 
agreements or regional policy coordination. Assuming that the primary objective of a 
climate action plan, or energy policy portfolio, is to reduce GHG emissions over the long 
run, individual states can also make concerted efforts to align the policy objectives, and 
therefore the policy design features, of the various policy instruments in their climate 
action plans. Several studies have also confirmed that policy instrument coordination can 
increase the effectiveness of energy and climate policy efforts (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; 
Gonzalez, 2007). Furthermore, individual states can add stipulations to their renewable 
energy and energy efficiency legislation that additionally regulates the amount or 
percentage of fossil fuel generation that can be produced and consumed in-state. Or, 
alternatively constructed, states can mandate that new RPS renewable energy capacity or 
DSM ―negawatts‖ must be matched one-for-one across comparable load levels with 
carbon-intensive fossil fuel plant retirements.  
It is worth noting, however, that each energy policy instrument that is included in 
a state portfolio is designed to address a fundamentally different market failure than just 
GHG emissions. For instance, RPS policies address the market failures associated with 
renewable energy market penetration. It is important to note that energy policy 
instruments can have some effect on GHG mitigation—and they can be optimally 
designed and coordinated so as to maximize total GHG mitigation potential, as argued 
above—however, energy policy instruments are not the same thing as climate policy 
instruments; and each type of instrument is associated with a different set of objectives, 
market failures, and mechanisms for policy action. 
 This analysis raises issues regarding the potential effectiveness of a ―progressive 
federalism‖ approach. It is not yet clear how much power the national government will 
grant states to maintain their own energy and climate policies, in the event that national 
climate change legislation is passed in coming years. The proposed Waxman-Markey 
bill, ―H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,‖ provides some 
insights on the possibility of federal preemption. The bill mandates that all states must 
comply and cannot interfere with the federal cap-and-trade during the first five years of 
operation, 2012-2017. After 2017, the bill allows states to set their own cap limits, so 
long as the state caps are more stringent than the federal caps. The bill offers few 
additional details regarding the authority of state governments, which suggests that the 
bill will likely preserve states’ authority to enact and maintain state level energy policy 
portfolios. However, many of the major policies that are currently found in state climate 
action plans are proposed as national regulations in the Waxman-Markey bill. For 
instance, the bill proposes a national RPS as well as an efficiency portfolio standard. 
Therefore, if the bill is enacted as proposed, any state with energy policies that match or 
are less strict than the national policy will be forced to abandon previous state regulations 
and instead comply with national standards. 
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 While some states, such as many in the Southeast, object on economic grounds to 
the national government setting energy policy regulations in additional to carbon 
regulations, this analysis finds evidence that a national policy portfolio could have a 
larger effect on global greenhouse gas emissions than state-led efforts. A combined 
federal cap-and-trade and national policy portfolio has the potential to produce the 
greatest carbon savings. 
 
7. Limitations 
 There are a number of limitations to this type of modeling analysis. The first set 
of limitations is associated with the choice of model, and with modeling analyses more 
generally. The second set of limitations includes those that are due to the methodological 
approach of the present study. 
 
7.1 Modeling Limitations 
 AURORAxmp is a bottom-up electricity model and, similar to other bottom-up 
models, it tends to demonstrate overly optimistic technology diffusion behavior. This is 
because a model such as AURORAxmp neglects to account for non-standard economic 
conditions in its optimization equation, such as transition costs, market uncertainties, and 
market imperfections. As a counter-balance to this trend, however, AURORAxmp bases 
its optimization logic purely on a cost-minimization equation, and thereby neglects to 
consider that some market actors deploy new energy systems due to non-cost factors. For 
instance, homeowners may install solar photovoltaic panels on their roofs because they 
believe that it is worth spending extra money on electricity in order to have minimal 
impact on their environment.  
 Another counter-balance to the overactive diffusion behavior is AURORAxmp’s 
failure to retire coal power plants at a specified terminal year. AURORAxmp does retire 
some coal power plants, but only those plants that the electric industry has already 
publicly designated for retirement or are well beyond their age limit. Many of remaining 
coal power plants are already over 30 years old. Yet the only way that these plants will be 
retired is if they cannot compete with the real annualized net present value of alternative 
resources. If these plants are already paid off, the chances of retirement are small. By the 
end of the study period, many of the WECC’s coal power plants are well over 60 years 
old, and some up to 80 years of age. In reality, one should assume that a portion of these 
coal plants will need to be replaced between 2010 and 2030, which will increase 
electricity costs and potentially decrease GHG emissions. Alternatively, a utility may 
simply update or retrofit their coal plants every so often, which would also increase the 
costs of electricity but result in indeterminate changes in GHG emissions. Considering 
the case of Utah, it is possible that Utah would make different construction and dispatch 
decisions if it had to replace a major coal power plant during the study period. Instead of 
constructing a new coal power plant, for instance, Utah may consider a biomass co-
combustion plant.  
 Non-linear bottom-up models also fail to consider technological change. More 
advanced, non-linear models make energy resource costs endogenous, which provides 
more realistic projections of future circumstances. This omission likely affects renewable 
and alternative energy options the most, since these resources are still experiencing 
downward trends on their respective marginal cost curves. 
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 Finally, AURORAxmp is an electricity dispatch model, not an integrated micro-
economic model such as NEMS or a macro-economic model such as the Applied 
Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy model (ADAGE).  Therefore, Aurora does not 
have the ability to find the lowest cost energy solutions across the entire economy; it is 
merely able to find the lowest cost electricity source given constraints on capacity, 
transmission and distribution capacities, and costs. 
 
7.2 Methodological Approach Limitations 
 This type of analysis is not rooted in causal inference. It is merely a modeling 
exercise based on electricity dispatch optimization logic. Model results are predictions 
based specifically on hypothetical scenarios, and dependent on variables that may be 
inaccurate projections of future circumstances. Furthermore, some scenarios relied on 
simplified assumptions; for instance, I assumed that 100 percent of all new RPS 
renewable energy would come from wind power with no trading of renewable energy 
certificates (RECs). In reality, an RPS policy will encourage the deployment of a variety 
of different renewable energy resources, including resources that may not have even been 
included in these scenario models. The trading of RECs across a region will also facilitate 
a more cost-effective renewable energy deployment pattern. The inability to model these 
options in the present analysis has likely resulted in cost estimates that are too high. On 
the other hand, some RPS policies may also include carve-out provisions for additional 
energy resources, such as solar or distributed generation; the failure to accurately model 
carve-out provisions of this variety alternatively could have resulted in cost estimates that 
are too low. It was also necessary to make simplifying assumptions about the capacity 
factor for the RPS wind energy that was forced into the model. In reality, capacity factors 
vary by location; and a 36 percent may be too high for the majority of locations. In this 
event, the amount of wind energy forced into the model may be too low, which would 
result in cost estimates that are too low. 
 In recognition of the inherent limitations of modeling analyses I ran a series of 
sensitivity analyses on the baseline scenario, and modeled variations in policy portfolio 
strength and carbon price levels. Results across the model variations were fairly 
consistent, and demonstrated mild sensitivity to model parameters, such as primary 
resource costs. Variations in carbon price and demand growth rates were found to be 
some of the most sensitive modeling inputs. 
 It was necessary to make assumptions concerning the study sample. I selected the 
WECC region for this sample, and Utah and Arizona as representative states within this 
region. The intent was to generate descriptive results that have generalizability; that is, 
the Utah and Arizona results could indicate broader state experiences, the WECC results 
could suggest national level trends, and the combination could lend insights into the 
dynamics of electricity sector interactions among states and across regional boundaries. 
Despite the large number of states, and the diversity and heterogeneity of state conditions 
within the WECC, it is possible that the WECC is not the most representative population 
for the other NERC regions, particularly those that have primarily market-based retail 
pricing, such as Northeastern states, as opposed to the regulated pricing found throughout 
the WECC.
21
 This study does not presume that all regions, or all states, will respond to 
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 As discussed above, the Northeastern states have identified the problem of carbon leakage in RGGI 
operations and are currently seeking methods of mitigating this leakage (RGGI, 2007). One may conclude, 
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policy portfolios or carbon prices in exactly the same fashion as the WECC, or as either 
Utah or Arizona. Nor does it presume that a national level coordinated policy portfolio 
will have the exact same effect as a regional coordination policy. Furthermore, it is 
indeed possible that Utah and Arizona are poor representations of the average state’s 
characteristics. What is more likely, however, is that there are a few states that have 
extreme characteristics—for instance, Maine, which shares only one state border and 
generates 29 percent of its total electricity from hydroelectricity—and simply cannot be 
represented by any other state. Fortunately, these strong assumptions are unnecessary. 
Future analyses may choose to improve the generalizability of the present results via a 
modeling exercise that includes the entire population sample, all 50 U.S. states and each 
NERC region. Future studies could additionally seek to identify empirically which factors 
are associated with improved or reduced cost-effectiveness of carbon mitigation policy 
portfolios. Future studies could also consider the differences in decarbonization effects 
between states that are regulated and those that are not. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 This study sought to explore whether state policy portfolios can be effective 
decarbonization strategies. The results of a scenario-based electric dispatch modeling 
exercise revealed the following descriptive trends: 
 Regional coordination policy portfolios demonstrate greater potential for 
decarbonization than do isolated state policy portfolios; 
 Some states benefit more from regional policy coordination than others, 
depending on the state’s demand growth, resource mix, and export-import 
strategy, among other unaccounted for factors; 
 Emissions leakage attenuates the effect of isolated state policy portfolios; 
 A carbon price coupled with regionally or nationally coordinated policy portfolios 
can be the most effective carbon mitigation option out, given the assumption and 
specifications employed in this analysis. 
  The need for further investigation of the effects of state level policy performance, 
and the federalist implications of state energy and climate policy leadership is immense. 
As our global society progresses with international climate change agreements, lessons 
from the U.S. states can provide valuable insights on the performance of energy 
portfolios, the occurrence of carbon leakage, and the interaction between climate policy 
and energy policy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
therefore, that the results of the present analysis are applicable, at least to some degree, to the Northeastern 
states’ experiences, and vice versa, despite the differences in retail price regulation. 
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Table 1. New Resource Option Parameters included in Baseline Scenario 
New Resource Type Heat rate 
(BTU/kWh) 
Capacity 
(kW) 
Variable 
O&M 
($/MWh) 
Fixed 
O&M 
($/MW/wk) 
Forced 
outage 
(%) 
Annual 
Max per 
State  
(# units) 
Total Max 
per State 
(# units) 
Leadtime 
(years) 
Peak 
Credit 
Multiplier    
(%)a 
Fuel Price 
($/mmBTU) 
Geothermal 33,729 50,000 3.66 4,599 5 10 50 4 1 1.74 
Solar Photovoltaic 10,022 5,000 0.27 11,047 45 5 100 2 0.6 0.00 
Biomass 9,646 80,000 7.96 6,721 5 1 2 4 0.6 0.05 
Municipal Solid 
Waste/Landfill 
13,648 30,000 2.55 5,346 5 1 3 3 0.6 1.16 
Wind 0 50,000 0.65 3,298 60 2(UT), 
0(AZ) 
10(UT), 
0(AZ) 
3 0.1 0.02 
Scrubbed Sub-
Critical Pulverized 
Coal 
8844-8600* 600,000 5.03 3977-
3784* 
7.5 1 2 (AZ), 1 
(UT) 
4 1 1.45-1.66* 
Integrated 
Gasification 
Combined Cycle 
8309-7200* 550,000 3.68 4702-
4343* 
7.5 1 2 4 1 1.45-1.66* 
Advanced Gas-Oil 
Combined Cycle 
Combustion Turbine 
6682-6333* 400,000 2.57 1869-
1738* 
4 10 100 3 1 0.17 
Advanced Simple 
Cycle Combustion 
Turbine  
9043-8550* 230,000 4.6 1270-
1159* 
6.5 5(UT), 
10(AZ) 
50(UT), 
150(AZ) 
3 1 0.00 
* indicates that variable ranged in the model over time. The number on the left is the 2008 value and the number on the right is the 
2030 value. 
a. Peak load multiplier is the proportion of a unit’s input capacity that can count toward the reserve margin criteria. 
Source of data: AEO2009 
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Table 2. Fixed Operations and Maintenance Costs for Baseline and Tax Incentive 
Scenarios 
New Resource Baseline Fixed O&M  
($/MW-wk) 
Tax Incentive Scenario Fixed O&M 
($/MW-wk) 
Wind 2,837 2,025 
Geothermal 4,599 3,852 
Solar Photovoltaic 11,047 7,244 
Biomass   6,721 4,706 
MSW/Landfill   5,346 4,074 
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Table 3. Carbon Capture and Storage Technological Improvement Model 
Assumptions 
 IGCC-CCS NGCC-CCS 
Year Heat rate  
(BTU/kWh) 
Fixed O&M 
($/MW/wk) 
Heat rate 
(BTU/kWh) 
Fixed O&M  
($/MW/wk) 
2007 10781 8612 8613 4594 
2010 10074 8532 8226 4550 
2015 9191 8373 7951 4464 
2020 8307 8142 7652 4339 
2025 8307 7920 7652 4219 
2030 8307 7702 7652 4101 
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Table 4. Carbon Capture and Storage Policy Scenario Parameters  
New 
Resource 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Variable 
O&M 
($/MWh) 
Year 
available 
Construction 
time (years) 
GHG rate 
(lb/mmBTU) 
Forced 
outage (%) 
Annual 
Max per 
State 
(# units) 
Total Max 
per State 
(# units) 
IGCC-CCS 380 7.09 2012 8 28.7 7.5 1 2 
NGCC-CCS 400 3.62 2012 8 16.7 4 2 5 
Source of data: AEO2009 
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Table 5. Summary of Modeling Scenarios 
  
Isolated 
State 
Regional 
Coordination  
$25 GHG 
Price 
$50 GHG 
Price 
Isolated 
state and 
Carbon 
Price 
Regional 
Coordination 
and Carbon 
Price 
Policy 
instruments 
included 
RPS RPS None None RPS RPS 
Tax 
incentives 
Tax 
incentives 
  Tax 
incentives 
Tax incentives 
DSM DSM   DSM DSM 
CCS CCS   CCS CCS 
Price of 
carbon 
$0 $0 $25/ton 
GHG 
equivalent 
$50/ton 
GHG 
equivalent 
$25 and 
$50/ton 
GHG 
equivalent 
$25 and 
$50/ton GHG 
equivalent 
"Moderate" 
version 
Adjustment 
for 
renewable 
energy 
Adjustment 
for renewable 
energy 
N/A N/A Adjustment 
for 
renewable 
energy 
Adjustment 
for renewable 
energy 
"Strong" 
version 
No 
adjustment 
for 
renewable 
energy 
No 
adjustment 
for renewable 
energy 
N/A N/A No 
adjustment 
for 
renewable 
energy 
No adjustment 
for renewable 
energy 
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Figure 1. Utah Baseline Generation 
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Figure 2. Arizona Baseline Generation 
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Table 6. Baseline Scenario Summary Results for Utah and Arizona, 2020 and 2030 
 Utah Baseline Arizona Baseline 
Year 2020 2030 2020 2030 
GHG emissions (tons) 42,817,980 42,330,430   68,982,250   79,998,250 
Average electricity price (2006$/MWh)       $59.69        $94.74          $60.58          $94.73 
Total generation (MWh) 45,677,199 44,626,119 132,678,868 161,227,928 
      Coal 40,420,559 40,370,177   51,091,534   55,276,935 
      Natural gas  3,620,296   2,623,095   42,723,130   65,847,285 
      Nuclear                0                 0   28,005,315   28,005,315 
      Hydroelectric     964,879      963,217   10,334,871   10,310,864 
      Wind                0                 0                   0                   0 
      Solar PV                0                 0         40,437          40,327 
      Geothermal                0                 0                  0                   0 
      Biomass    671,464      669,630       245,754     1,510,027 
      Landfill/MSW                0                 0       237,827        237,177 
Total New Generation (MWh)                0                 0   12,096,511   59,193,580 
      Coal                0                 0     9,343,980   13,587,788 
      Natural gas                0                 0     2,752,531   44,103,671 
      Wind                0                 0                   0                   0 
      Solar PV                0                 0                   0                   0 
      Geothermal                0                 0                   0                   0 
      Biomass                0                 0                   0     1,264,944 
      Landfill/MSW                0                 0        237,827         237,177 
Electricity demand (MW)         4134            4931          12634           16164 
Exports (MW)         1,781           1,037            2,927             2,762 
Imports (MW)            748             923               491                577 
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Table 7. Utah Baseline Sensitivity Analysis Summary Results, 2030  
 Baseline 15% Cost 
Increase 
25% Cost 
Increase 
Technological 
Innovation 
Decreased 
Demand 
Growth 
Adjustment 
Increased 
Demand 
Growth 
Adjustment 
GHG emissions (tons) 42,330,430 42,437,190 42,243,450 42,422,220 42,419,830 42,717,550 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
$94.74  $96.62  $95.68  $96.28 $96.04 $97.00 
Total generation (MWh) 44,626,119 44,893,176 44,486,517 44,826,394 44,819,593 45,515,386 
      Coal 40,370,177 40,353,105 40,324,914 40,368,471 40,367,390 40,380,297 
      Natural gas 2,623,095 2,907,224 2,528,755 2,825,076 2,819,356 3,502,241 
      Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Hydroelectric 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 
      Wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 669,630 669,630 669,630 669,630 669,630 669,630 
      Landfill/MSW 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total New Generation 
(MWh) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Natural gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Landfill/MSW 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Demand 4,941 4,941 4,941 4,941 4,652 5,241 
Exports 1,037 1,106 928 929 1,277 847 
Imports 923 963 827 787 855 931 
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Table 8. Arizona Baseline Sensitivity Analysis Summary Results, 2030  
 Baseline 15% Cost 
Increase 
25% Cost 
Increase 
Technological 
Innovation 
Decreased 
Demand 
Growth 
Adjustment 
Increased 
Demand 
Growth 
Adjustment 
GHG emissions (tons) 79,998,250 80,223,270 80,160,130 79,155,510 79,776,490 83,211,670 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
$94.73  $95.02  $95.14  $95.65 $94.20 $95.81 
Total generation (MWh) 161,227,928 161,825,800 161,695,971 159,311,296 160,701,503 169,432,580 
      Coal 55,276,935 55,275,848 55,276,152 55,268,571 55,270,228 55,276,286 
      Natural gas 65,847,285 66,446,243 66,316,109 63,464,662 65,485,684 73,815,408 
      Nuclear 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 
      Hydroelectric 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 
      Wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Solar PV 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 1,510,027 1,510,027 1,510,027 1,510,027 877,555 1,510,027 
      Landfill/MSW 237,177 237,177 237,177 711,531 711,531 474,354 
Total New Generation 
(MWh) 
59,193,580 59,318,188 59,762,314 57,255,392 61,013,478 65,928,075 
      Coal 13,587,788 13,587,788 13,587,788 13,587,788 13,587,788 13,587,788 
      Natural gas 44,103,671 44,228,279 44,672,406 41,691,130 46,081,687 50,600,989 
      Wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 1,264,944 1,264,944 1,264,944 1,264,944 632,472 1,264,944 
      Landfill/MSW 237,177 237,177 237,177 711,531 711,531 474,354 
Demand 16,164 16,164 16,164 16,164 15,243 17,137 
Exports 2,762 3,214 2,544 2,177 3,248 2,928 
Imports 577 978 287 220 211 787 
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Table 9. Utah Portfolio Scenario Results in 2030 
 Baseline Moderate 
Isolated State 
Portfolio 
Strong 
Isolated State 
Portfolio 
Moderate 
Regional 
Coordination 
Portfolio 
Strong 
Regional 
Coordination 
Portfolio 
GHG emissions (tons) 42,330,430 42,012,020 42,020,000 41,138,700 40,224,960 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
       $94.74      $128.25     $130.18     $118.28      $117.39 
Total generation (MWh) 44,626,119 49,284,319 50,212,348 48,462,353 48,177,891 
   All Coal 40,370,177 40,314,138 40,319,958 39,453,392 38,619,945 
      IGCC CCS                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   All Natural gas   2,623,095   2,018,306   2,034,780   1,967,137    1,700,337 
      NGCC CCS                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   Nuclear                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   All renewables   1,632,847   6,951,874   7,857,609   7,041,823    7,857,609 
      Hydroelectric      963,217       963,217      963,217      963,217       963,217 
      Wind                 0   5,319,027   6,224,762   5,408,976    6,224,762 
      Solar PV                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
      Geothermal                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
      Biomass      669,630      669,630      669,630      669,630       669,630 
      Landfill/MSW                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
Total New Generation (MWh)                   0   5,319,027   6,224,762   5,408,976    6,224,762 
   All Coal                   0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
      IGCC CCS                   0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   All Natural gas                   0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
      NGCC CCS                   0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   All renewables                   0   5,319,027   6,224,762   5,408,976    6,224,762 
      Wind                   0   5,319,027   6,224,762   5,408,976    6,224,762 
      Solar PV                   0                 0                0                 0                  0 
      Geothermal                   0                 0                0                 0                  0 
      Biomass                   0                 0                0                 0                  0 
      Landfill/MSW                 0                 0                0                 0                  0 
Electricity demand (MW)            4931          3,953         3,953          3,953           3,953 
Exports           1,037          2,283         2,254          2,227           2,273 
Imports             923              637             496            682             763 
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Figure 3. Utah GHG Emissions 
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Figure 4. Utah Retail Price of Electricity
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Table 10. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline and Portfolio Scenarios, 
Utah 
 State Portfolio Regional Portfolio Factor of Difference 
Year 2020    424,250   1,155,650 2.7 
Year 2030    310,430   2,105,470 6.8 
Cumulative 2010-2030 3,967,960 20,325,700 5.1 
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Figure 5. Utah Net Exports-Imports 
Carley working paper  January 2011 
Table 11. Arizona Portfolio Scenario Results in 2030 
 Baseline Moderate  
Isolated State 
Portfolio 
Strong  
Isolated State 
Portfolio 
Moderate 
Regional 
Coordination 
Portfolio 
Strong 
Regional 
Coordination 
Portfolio 
GHG emissions (tons)   79,998,250   67,111,291   66,415,066   66,467,080   64,743,290 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
         $94.73       $124.52        $127.47        $116.12        $113.48 
Total generation (MWh) 161,227,928 139,614,563 139,977,049 140,997,418 141,001,189 
   All Coal   55,276,935   58,182,910   58,161,484   54,558,253   53,248,062 
      IGCC CCS                   0     2,950,491      2,950,491                   0                   0 
   All Natural gas   65,847,285   25,353,731   24,236,932   30,393,390   29,606,316 
      NGCC CCS                   0                   0                   0                   0                   0 
   Nuclear   28,005,315   28,005,315   28,005,315   28,005,315   28,005,315 
   All renewables    12,098,395   28,072,607   29,573,318   28,040,460   30,141,496 
      Hydroelectric   10,310,864   10,310,864   10,310,864   10,310,864   10,310,864 
      Wind                   0   15,737,036   17,870,219   15,467,712   17,331,571 
      Solar PV          40,327          40,327          40,327          40,327          40,327 
      Geothermal                   0                   0                    0                   0                    0 
      Biomass     1,510,027     1,510,027        877,555     1,510,027     1,510,027 
      Landfill/MSW        237,177        474,354        474,354         711,531        948,708 
Total New Generation (MWh)   59,193,580   36,965,103   38,465,814   31,057,574   33,117,805 
   All Coal   13,587,788   16,538,279   16,538,279   13,587,788   13,470,185 
      IGCC CCS                   0     2,950,491     2,950,491                   0                   0 
   All Natural gas   44,103,671                   0                   0          25,600        102,398 
      NGCC CCS                   0                   0                   0                   0                   0 
 All renewables      1,502,121             17,476,334   18,977,045   17,444,187   19,545,223 
      Wind                   0   15,737,036   17,870,219   15,467,712   17,331,571 
      Solar PV                   0                   0                   0                   0                   0 
      Geothermal                   0                   0                   0                   0                   0 
      Biomass     1,264,944     1,264,944        632,472     1,264,944    1,264,944 
      Landfill/MSW         237,177        474,354       474,354         711,531        948,708 
Demand           16164           12,873         12,873          12,873          12,873 
Exports             2,762            3,267           3,301            3,625            3,620 
Imports                577              264             254               466               570 
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Figure 6. Arizona GHG Emissions 
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Figure 7. Arizona Retail Price of Electricity 
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Table 12. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline and Portfolio Scenarios, 
Arizona 
 State Portfolio Regional Portfolio Factor of Difference 
Year 2020   10,819,110   11,622,010 1.1 
Year 2030   13,583,184   15,254,960 1.1 
Cumulative 2010-2030 185,011,874 195,898,470 1.1 
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Figure 8. Arizona New Generation 
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Figure 9. Arizona Generation, State 
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Figure 10. Arizona Generation, Regional 
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Figure 11. Arizona Net Exports-Imports 
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Table 13. Utah Carbon Price Portfolio Results, 2030 
 Baseline $25 GHG $50 GHG Regional 
Portfolio & 
$25 GHG 
Regional 
Portfolio & 
$50 GHG 
Regional 
Portfolio & 
$25 GHG 
with Demand 
Sensitivity 
Regional 
Portfolio & 
$50 GHG 
with 
Demand 
Sensitivity 
GHG emissions (tons) 42,330,430 41,403,110 30,750,730 37,548,740 25,710,150 38,636,930 25,958,750 
Average electricity 
price (2006$/MWh) 
$94.74  $115.36 $139.27 $133.57  $169.82  $136.47 $172.72 
Total generation 
(MWh) 
44,626,119 46,826,431 43,823,229 45,785,514 37,490,244 47,134,922 36,533,035 
   All Coal 40,370,177 39,733,807 25,063,982 36,134,930 23,336,549 37,002,228 23,508,173 
      IGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   All Natural gas 2,623,095 2,250,267 13,566,489 1,614,157 4,616,155 2,094,504 4,988,047 
      NGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Nuclear 0 0  0 0 0 0 
   All renewables 1,632,847 4,842,358 5,192,758 8,036,426 9,537,540 8,038,190 8,036,815 
      Hydroelectric 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 
      Wind 0 1,051,200 1,401,600 6,224,762 6,224,762 6,224,762 6,224,762 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 181,836 181,836 180,426 181,058 181,477 181,237 
      Biomass 669,630 1,934,574 1,934,574 668,021 1,931,325 668,733 667,599 
      Landfill/MSW 0 711,531 711,531 0 237,177 0 0 
Total New Generation 
(MWh) 
0 3,027,675 12,148,550 6,405,188 7,907,942 6,224,762 6,224,762 
   All Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      IGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   All Natural gas 0 0 8,770,475 0 0 0 0 
      NGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   All renewables 0 3,027,675 3,378,075 6,405,188 7,907,942 6,224,762 6,224,762 
      Wind 0 1,051,200 1,401,600 6,224,762 6,224,762 6,224,762 6,224,762 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 0 1,264,944 1,264,944 0 1,264,944 0 0 
      Landfill/MSW 0 711,531 711,531 0 237,177 0 0 
Demand (MW) 4,931 4,941 4,941 3,953 3,953 3,863 3,822 
Exports 1,037 1,084 575 1,840 1,022 2,086 845 
Imports 923 713 534 595 725 596 518 
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Table 14. Arizona Carbon Price Portfolio Results, 2030 
 Baseline $25 GHG $50 GHG Regional 
Portfolio & 
$25 GHG 
Regional 
Portfolio & 
$50 GHG 
Regional 
Portfolio & 
$25 GHG 
with 
Demand 
Sensitivity 
Regional 
Portfolio & 
$50 GHG 
with 
Demand 
Sensitivity 
GHG emissions 
(tons) 
79,998,250 78,322,080 60,234,120 55,974,080 41,122,600 53,720,590 40,693,920 
Average electricity 
price (2006$/MWh) 
$94.73  $115.43 $132.78 $130.97  $156.81  $134.30 $161.69 
Total generation 
(MWh) 
161,227,92
8 
159,780,563 162,671,316 134,433,978 130,982,117 130,308,993 123,473,138 
   All Coal 55,276,935 54,400,005 20,873,594 48,807,496 28,316,060 45,344,357 25,959,029 
      IGCC CCS 0 0 0 2,950,373 5,891,468 2,946,480 2,943,482 
   All Natural gas 65,847,285 64,802,495 101,219,659 25,741,120 42,786,073 27,292,553 40,475,608 
      NGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Nuclear 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 
   All renewables 12,098,395 12,572,748 12,572,748 31,880,046 31,874,669 29,666,768 29,033,186 
      Hydroelectric 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 
      Wind 0 0 0 17,331,571 17,331,571 17,331,571 17,331,571 
      Solar PV 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 1,510,027 1,510,027 1,510,027 2,774,223 2,768,846 1,509,653 876,072 
      Landfill/MSW 237,177 711,531 711,531 1,423,062 1,423,062 474,354 474,354 
Total New 
Generation (MWh) 
59,193,580 56,625,322 84,235,638 33,028,352 32,311,089 26,277,061 21,381,878 
   All Coal 13,587,788 13,587,788 0 11,743,832 5,891,468 7,206,193 2,943,482 
      IGCC CCS 0 0 0 2,950,373 5,891,468 2,946,625 2,941,125 
   All Natural gas 44,103,671 41,061,060 82,259,163 0 5,135,100 0 0 
      NGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   All renewables 1,502,121 1,976,475 1,976,475 21,284,521 21,284,521 19,070,869 18,438,397 
      Wind 0 0 0 17,331,571 17,331,571 17,331,571 17,331,571 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 1,264,944 1,264,944 1,264,944 2,529,888 2,529,888 1,264,944 632,472 
      Landfill/MSW 237,177 711,531 711,531 1,423,062 1,423,062 474,354 474,354 
Demand (MW) 16,164 16,164 16,164 12,873 12,873 12,328 12,058 
Exports 2,762 2,833 2,645 2,624 2,618 2,905 2,345 
Imports 577 813 275 201 582 415 343 
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Figure 12. Utah Carbon Price Scenarios         
 
Carley working paper  January 2011 
Figure 13. Arizona Carbon Price Scenarios 
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Figure 14. WECC GHG Emissions 
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Table 15. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline and Portfolio Scenarios,  
All Scenarios 
Scenario Utah Arizona WECC 
Utah Isolated State Scenario 310,430 - 2,075,774 
Arizona Isolated State Scenario - 14,599,070 20,440,067 
Regional Coordination Scenario 2,105,470 15,254,960 185,290,684 
$25 GHG Scenario 927,320 1,676,170 46,136,496 
$50 GHG Scenario 11,579,700 19,764,130 159,222,955 
Regional Coordination and $25 GHG Scenario 4,781,690 24,024,170 226,760,515 
Regional Coordination and $50 GHG Scenario 16,620,280 38,875,650 304,105,276 
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Table 16. Program Costs (in $/GHG equivalent tons saved) 
Scenario Utah Arizona WECC 
Utah Isolated State Scenario $2,877 - $430 
Arizona Isolated State Scenario - $187 $133 
Regional Coordination Scenario $424 $179 $101 
 
